tions in him of representations in me of representations in him of one thing
and another. If mutual friends figured in the tale being told, I would
unconsciously look for compromises between my image of his representa-
tions of them, and my own images of them. Pure recursion would simply be
an inappropriate formalism for dealing with symbol amalgams of this type.
And I have barely scratched the surface! We plainly lack the vocabulary
today for describing the complex interactions that are possible between
symbols. So let us stop before we get bogged down.
We should note, however, that computer systems are beginning to run
into some of the same kinds of complexity, and therefore some of these
notions have been given names. For instance, my "mountain" symbol is
analogous to what in computer jargon is called shared (or reentrant) code-
code which can be used by two or more separate timesharing programs
running on a single computer. The fact that activation of one symbol can
have different results when it is part of different subsystems can be ex-
plained by saying that its code is being processed by different interpreters.
Thus, the triggering patterns in the "mountain" symbol are not absolute;
they are relative to the system within which the symbol is activated.
The reality of such "subbrains" may seem doubtful to some. Perhaps
the following quote from M. C. Escher, as he discusses how he creates his
periodic plane-filling drawings, will help to make clear what kind of
phenomenon I am referring to:While drawing I sometimes feel as if I were a spiritualist medium, controlled
by the creatures which I am conjuring up. It is as if they themselves decide on
the shape in which they choose to appear. They take little account of my
critical opinion during their birth and I cannot exert much influence on the
measure of their development. They are usually very difficult and obstinate
creatures.^2
Here is a perfect example of the near-autonomy of certain subsystems of
the brain, once they are activated. Escher's subsystems seemed to him
almost to be able to override his esthetic judgment. Of course, this opinion
must be taken with a grain of salt, since those powerful subsystems came
into being as a result of his many years of training and submission to
precisely the forces that molded his esthetic sensitivities. In short, it is
wrong to divorce the subsystems in Escher's brain from Escher himself or
from his esthetic judgement. They consititute a vital part of his esthetic
sense, where "he" is the complete being of the artist.The Self-Symbol and ConsciousnessA very important side effect of the self-subsystem is that it can play the role
of "soul", in the following sense: in communicating constantly with the rest
of the subsystems and symbols in the brain, it keeps track of what symbols
are active, and in what way. This means that it has to have symbols for
mental activity-in other words, symbols for symbols, and symbols for the
actions of symbols.Minds and Thoughts 387