196 Christopher R. Bell
Dumont, citing Clark and Watson, highlights that Eysenck’s two-
dimensional trait model can produce four different trait combinations—
emotionally stable and extroverted, emotionally unstable and extroverted,
emotionally stable and introverted, emotionally unstable and introverted—
that map directly onto Galen’s theory of temperament based upon the four
humors: sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic. Regarding this
unexpected anachronistic link between an ancient and contemporary
personality theory, Dumont (2010) states:
It is fascinating that the psychobiological formulation of the Greeks
is so nicely replicated in the work of Eysenck. The drawbacks of such a
molar approach to conceptualizing human variability is that it can mask
the complexity that underlies our constructions. (p. 175)A major criticism of Trait theory is that although it purports to be
‘atheoretical’ and simply descriptive, it nevertheless implies that
psychological traits are directly attributable to a person’s physiological
constitution. A similar criticism has been leveled at psychiatric diagnoses,
namely that what purport to be theory-neutral descriptions of
psychopathology imply a theory of biological causation and treatment.^3 In
this regard, it is perhaps no surprise that Eysenck’s original trait theory
could map on so precisely to Galen’s biologically based theory of
temperament. Dumont (2010) notes that Eysenck in particular placed a
heavy emphasis on the genetic basis of not only personality but of
intelligence as well (p. 176). As such, trait theories of personality might be
considered intellectual heirs to Sir Francis Galton’s eugenics research
program which focused on quantitatively assessing individual differences
in the late 19th century. Allan R. Buss notes that Galton’s focus on
individual differences did not arise in an ideological vacuum but was rather
(^3) As Frances (2014) observes: “It was true that the criteria sets were based on surface symptoms
and said nothing about causes or treatments. But the surface symptoms method fit very
neatly with a biological, medical model of mental disorder and greatly promoted it. The
rejection of more inferential psychological constructs and social context severely
disadvantaged...other models and put psychiatry into something of a reductionistic
straightjacket” (p. 65).