144Chapter 8
Muslims were increasingly distracted by a series of
civil wars. The hard work of dislodging them from their
bases in Spain and the Balearics was for the most part
undertaken by naval forces based on the Italian towns,
not by feudal levies. Relative security was achieved in
the western Mediterranean only by the end of the
eleventh century.
The Vikings, too, may have returned home for rea-
sons of their own. Even as they raided, the Scandina-
vian chiefs fought for hegemony among themselves.
Much of the treasure they seized was used to buy influ-
ence and hire mercenaries for their dynastic quarrels.
By the beginning of the eleventh century, this process
had created the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden. The new rulers sought divine sanction by
adopting Christianity and did everything in their power
to monopolize the use of military force. Freebooting
was actively discouraged because it led to the creation
of alternative centers of power. The church condemned
freebooting because it was directed against Christians.
In the meantime, agricultural productivity seems to
have improved, allowing reformed Vikings to accept
the new policy without too much hardship.
The Consolidation of Feudalism: Subinfeudation
and the Heritability of Fiefs
Feudalism did not guarantee the salvation of Europe,
but in much of the subcontinent it altered the structure
of society beyond recognition. An expedient adopted
in a time of poverty and dire peril evolved into a com-
plex of social and economic relationships that survived
for half a millennium.
The process began with subinfeudation, which in-
creased political decentralization and weakened the
power of kings (see document 8.3). The bonds of
homage and fealty were entirely personal. A vassal who
held his benefice from a count owed nothing to the
king. If a tenant-in-chief (a lord who held land directly
from the sovereign) chose not to honor his obligations
under the feudal contract, all of his subtenants could be
expected to follow suit. Moreover, fiefs commonly were
accumulated from more than one lord. Conflicts of loy-
alty were therefore inevitable, and some of the greater
vassals used them to build a power base of their own.
The counts of Flanders, for example, held lands from the
kings of both East Francia and West Francia. They easily
played one against the other to create what amounted
to an independent state by the end of the ninth century.
Because feudal tenures were theoretically based on
service and good only for the lifetime of the vassal, de-
priving a disloyal tenant of his benefice should have
been easy, but this was not the case. By granting their
lands in fief, kings reduced their military force to a
household guard that might be no more numerous than
the companions of any major tenant-in-chief. Depri-
vation of one important vassal therefore required the
assistance of others, and most were reluctant to
participate in an action that could one day be applied
to them.
Political pressures were moving strongly in the op-
posite direction. As the decentralization of military
force increased, kings were forced to offer better terms
in return for support. Fiefs inevitably became heritable.
Vassals wished to provide for the security of their fami-
lies, and the right to pass lands on to their children was
demanded with increasing frequency in negotiatingDOCUMENT 8.3
Subinfeudation
This declaration of homage indicates some of the problems
caused by subinfeudation as well as the kind of compromise
that might, in theory, alleviate them.I, John of Toul, make known that I am the liege
man of the lady Beatrice, countess of Troyes, and
of her son, Theobald, count of Champagne,
against every creature, living or dead, saving my
allegiance to Enjourand of Coucy, lord John of Ar-
cis, and the count of Grandpré. If it should happen
that the count of Grandpré should be at war with
the countess and count of Champagne on his own
quarrel, I will aid the count of Grandpré in my
own person, and will send to the count and count-
ess of Champagne the knights whose service I owe
to them for the fief which I hold of them. But if
the count of Grandpré shall make war on the
countess and the count of Champagne on behalf
of his friends and not by his own quarrel, I will aid
in my own person the countess and count of
Champagne, and will send one knight to the count
of Grandpré for the service which I owe him for
the fief which I hold of him, but I will not go my-
self into the territory of the count of Grandpré to
make war on him.
Thatcher, O. J., and McNeal, E. H., eds. A Source Book of
Medieval History.New York: Scribner’s, 1905.