Greek Culture and Its Hellenistic Diffusion 49heavily to the left and held back the right. This unbal-
anced formation, supported by cavalry on his right
flank, enabled him to crush the Spartans at their
strongest point and envelop them. The use of deep for-
mations, effectively supported for the first time by cav-
alry, would be greatly expanded by the Macedonians.
Though supported by the relative wealth of Boeo-
tia, Theban hegemony lasted no longer than that of
the Spartans. The Athenians had revived their alliance
system in the years immediately before Leuctra and,
fearing Theban ambition, soon turned it against
Epaminondas. By 362 B.C.the Peloponnesians had also
reconstituted their confederacy, and though Epaminon-
das defeated the combined forces of Athens and Sparta
at Mantinea, he died in the battle. Deprived of his lead-
ership, Theban military power declined. Without the
stimulus of threats from Thebes or Sparta, the “second”
Athenian Empire collapsed, and Greece reverted to its
traditional state of disorganization.
A century of warfare had brought economic de-
cline and social tension to the Greek cities. The
Carthaginians encroached upon their overseas markets
while the Greek colonies in Italy became, of necessity,
more self-sufficient. As exports diminished, thousands
of Greeks sought employment as mercenaries. One
such group found itself stranded in Mesopotamia when
the schemes of their Persian employer miscarried. A
leader of the expedition, the Athenian writer and mili-
tary theorist Xenophon (c. 431–c. 350 B.C.) left a vivid
account of their march to the Black Sea coast and
safety. Xenophon and the career of Epaminondas show
that Greek fighting men had lost nothing of their skill
and valor. The artistic and intellectual achievements of
the fourth century B.C.demonstrate that the culture
was alive and well. But for all its evident vigor, Greece
had become a political vacuum.
That vacuum was filled by the Macedonians. An-
cient Macedonia occupied the broad plain at the head
of the Thermaic Gulf in northeastern Greece. Its peo-
ple spoke a dialect of Greek, but their social and politi-
cal institutions were different from those of the poleis.
The population was almost entirely rural and, by Greek
standards, widely scattered. Rich pastures encouraged
the raising of horses. Macedonian society was therefore
dominated by a landholding aristocracy that fought on
horseback, usually against the neighboring hill tribes
whose raids posed a constant threat to the country’s
borders. Hereditary kings tried to rule, with or without
cooperation from the aristocracy, and internal strife was
common. To other Greeks, the Macedonians seemed
primitive, but their homeland was rich in timber, miner-
als, and agricultural resources. Many believed that if
Macedon could achieve stability it would one day be-
come a major power.
That goal was achieved by Philip II (382–336 B.C.).
Philip was a younger son of the Macedonian royal fam-
ily who, while hostage at Thebes, had observed the
military reforms of Epaminondas. His brother died in
359 B.C.and left Philip as regent for the youthful heir,
Amyntas IV. Cunning and energetic, Philip used his po-
sition to remove political rivals and suppress the local
hill tribes. In 357–356 B.C.he seized Amphipolis and
then Mt. Pangaeus with its rich deposits of gold and sil-
ver. At about this time he also took control of his
nephew’s throne.
With his political base secure, and fortified by the
wealth of Mt. Pangaeus, Philip moved to extend his
power over Greece as a whole. Through warfare,
bribery, and skilled diplomacy, Philip played upon the
disunity of the Greeks until it was too late for them to
mount an effective resistance. In 338 B.C.he defeated a
poorly organized army of Thebans and Athenians at
Chaeronea and became master of the Greek world. For
the most part, Philip wore his new authority lightly. He
secured a measure of acceptance by not interfering in
local politics, but his plan to lead the united Greeks
against Persia did not materialize in his lifetime.
Philip II left a formidable legacy. Not only did he
unite the Greeks, but he also created the army with
which his son Alexander III, “the Great,” would conquer
most of the known world (see illustration 3.4). The
heart of the Macedonian army remained the compan-
ions of the king, some two thousand cavalry armed
with sword and spear. They were supported by infantry
drawn up in the Macedonian phalanx, a formation that
differed substantially from that of the hoplites. The
peasants of Macedonia could not afford hoplite equip-
ment, and their geographic isolation made intensive
training difficult. Philip solved these problems by ar-
ranging his men into deep formations and arming them
with spears longer than those used by the hoplites. By
fighting in tightly closed ranks, the Macedonians could
thereby present an almost impenetrable front without
the need for highly specialized combat skills.
Hoplites were added to the Macedonian ranks as
Philip’s system of alliances grew. He also recruited mer-
cenary horsemen from Thessaly and supplemented his
infantry with slingers, bowmen, and javelin throwers.
The genius of Philip (and Alexander) lay in the ability
to coordinate these varied elements and to make even
the cavalry fight as a disciplined tactical unit instead of
as individual champions. But the Macedonians were