74Chapter 4
and successor, Hasdrubal, bound them to Carthage by
force or negotiation, creating in the process the nucleus
of a formidable army. The Second Punic War (218–202
B.C.) grew out of Roman attempts to interfere with this
process and nearly ended in the destruction of Rome.
Rome demanded a treaty limiting Carthaginian expan-
sion to the region south of the river Ebro but then
formed an alliance with Saguntum, a city within the
Carthaginian sphere of influence. The new Carthagin-
ian commander, Hamilcar’s son Hannibal (247–c. 183
B.C.), had long dreamed of avenging his country’s de-
feat in the First Punic War. Knowing that the Romans
would retaliate, he took Saguntum by siege. Then,
while the Romans raised an army to invade Spain, he
took the war to Italy, threatening Rome and forcing the
Romans to divide their forces.
With his Spanish army, his African mercenaries,
and a famous contingent of war elephants, Hannibal
crossed the Alps and allied himself with the Gauls,
whose hatred for Rome had in no way diminished. He
knew that Rome was too large and well fortified to be
conquered, but he hoped by a show of force to disen-
gage the Italian allies from their allegiance. In spite of
tireless diplomacy and exquisite care for the lives and
property of the Italians, this effort was largely a failure.
Success in battle was easier to achieve. Hannibal
defeated the Romans on the banks of the river Trebbia
and then crossed the Appenines to defeat them again at
Lake Trasimeno. The Romans adopted a mobile defense
under the leadership of the dictator Quintus Fabius
Maximus (known as Cunctator, or the delayer). Realiz-
ing that he could not defeat the Carthaginians in the
llustration 4.5
A Roman Warship of the Late Re-
public.The wars with Carthage forced
the Romans to become a maritime
power for the first time in their history.
This segment of a frieze in the Vatican
Museum shows troops disembarking
from a galley of the type used during the
Punic Wars.
field, Fabius drew them into southern Italy, maintaining
contact with the enemy but avoiding a battle. Many
Romans felt that this strategy was for cowards, but
when the successors of Fabius reversed his policies and
sought a battle at Cannae in 216 B.C., the Roman le-
gions were virtually annihilated. Hannibal had uncov-
ered the tactical weakness of the Roman legions: They
were trained only to move forward and were therefore
vulnerable to cavalry attacks from the sides and rear.
His Spanish and African infantry fell back before the
Roman assault but did not break; his Carthaginian cav-
alry enveloped the Romans, leaving them surrounded.
As many as forty-eight thousand were slain on the spot.
Cannae was the worst defeat in the history of the
Roman republic and one of the great military disasters
of all time. It led to the defection of Capua, the largest
city in Campania, and indirectly to a revolt in Syracuse
that threatened Roman control over Sicily. The Romans
were forced to besiege both cities while reverting to
Fabian tactics in Apulia where Hannibal remained at
large. Rome was approaching the end of its agricultural
and financial resources. Nearly 200,000 men were un-
der arms in Spain, Italy, and Sicily. Italian agriculture
had been devastated by the campaigns, and Rome was
increasingly dependent upon imports of grain from
Sicily and Sardinia. The Carthaginians, who under-
stood the economic dimensions of war better than
most, attacked the latter in 215 B.C. while forming an
alliance with Philip V of Macedon, who harassed
Rome’s allies on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Rome
was engaged on no fewer than five fronts.