China, Perceived Power
93Technology is not what puts China in first place in this business, but
China is becoming a big seller in arms markets eager for second and third
generation systems, and this fact can change the balance in South Asia,
and even in Africa and South America, if Brazil does not take a hard
stance in this matter. Every emergent power should care about the
distribution of sophisticated systems of arms to preserve its future. However,
China is preparing cheap guns and feasible systems for a hard assault for
distribution on the global market. The selling of guns fit into a particular
market dominated by industrialized nations of the West, but it appears that
new manufacturers are prepared to compete and supply the smaller markets.
China continues to be dependent in matters related to the importation of high
technology systems, but has begun a career in selling the surplus.
China’s new trend–of focusing on the modernization of a single
industry that was traditionally dominated by developed countries–could
indicate (along with its recent interest in the sea) the beginning of a future
policy typical of a great regional power.
In matters relating to the policy of the sea, we can distinguish a wise
and historic position of recognition of the establishment, and a respect for
its neighbors. If there are disputes at sea, the fact is that China is exposed
to a sea attack by the straits of Malacca. But it is important to consider
what Shi Xiaoqin says:
Any serious and objective assessment of the East Asian Security would
conclude that China’s reluctance to use or threat to use military power in
the South China Sea territorial disputes and its efforts to work with
ASEAN with great patience and sincerity should be considered one of the
main reasons for lasting peace and stability in East Asia in the past
decade.^21China tends to project the image that it is considering its naval power as a
defensive option. We will wait and see if that is true.
Yet, one of the most evident signs of the awakening dragon is certainly
the Shanghai pact, which federates a lot of interests within a flexible
structure where the Chinese patience for the chessboard predominates–the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This was a clear result of the
desire of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to
counter-balance the United States’ influence in the region. Problems of
borders under dispute were discussed and were the subject of an
agreement entitled: “Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border
Regions.”
(^21) Xiaoqin, “An Analysis of China’s Concept of Sea Power,” 12.