Chapter Eight
138
interest, including Japan, the European Union, and the United States. For
example, Philippa Brant reveals that a representative from the Japanese
Embassy in Fiji admitted that “Japan at the PALM 5 meeting increased its
regional aid budget because [of] Chinese Aid in the South Pacific. It saw
what China last pledged and wanted to have a little more, so [it] changed
the budget.”^92 Such renewed interest should be seen as pre-emptive rather
than reactive because, as Jian Yang contends, the South Pacific is not
essential to China’s security strategy and Beijing has neither the hard
power nor the soft power to become a hegemon in the region in the
foreseeable future.^93
In another meticulously researched 2011 study - The Pacific Islands in
China’s Grand Strategy - Jian Yang argues that “China is playing an
important role in the evolution of the regional order,”^94 but stresses that its
influence is not “deep-rooted,” and that it has relatively poor connections
in non-economic areas. Generally, Chinese scholars acknowledge that
China has an appetite for the natural resources of the region, but remark
that China’s involvement delivers great development opportunities to the
Pacific Island countries. Chinese officials and diplomats formulate the
same concept in an idealistic fashion. For example, Chinese Minister of
Commerce Chen Deming said at the 2008 China-PIC Forum: “Politically,
we believe every country, regardless of its size, strength and wealth is an
equal member of the international community. We respect the individual
choice of PICs for their way of development and their efforts in
safeguarding sovereignty and regional stability.”^95 There is normally no
denial by the Chinese that Beijing’s activities in the South Pacific,
including aid, are predicated on China’s national interest, as they are in the
other regional theatres, but what the dominant geopolitical narrative
contends in reality is not that China might have a “strategic interest” in the
Pacific Islands per se, but rather that it has the potential to affect Western
“strategic interests.” As one donor representative admitted, “Western
donors are just jealous and worried about increased competition.”^96
(^92) Interview by Philippa Brant, (SP021), 28 September 2009. Philippa Brant,
“Chinese Aid in the South Pacific: Linked to Resources?”, 165-166.
(^93) Yang, “China in the South Pacific: Hegemon on the horizon?”, 139-158.
(^94) Yang, The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games,
145.
(^95) Chen, “Remarks at the investment, trade and tourism ministerial conference of
the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation
Forum.”
(^96) Interview by Philippa Brant (SP017), 24 September 2009. Philippa Brant,
“Chinese Aid in the South Pacific: Linked to Resources?”, 166.