Chapter Nine
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In this drastically changing security environment, the Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzǀ Abe stresses that Japan should reestablish its national
power and reinforce the military alliance with the U.S. as a linchpin of the
national security of Japan. To achieve this goal, the Abe administration
has concentrated on three pillars of national security: first, reinforcement
of the Japan-U.S. alliance; second, improvement of self-defense
capability; and third, development of a multilateral security network.
Beijing and Seoul strongly criticize Japan’s efforts, especially the defense
capability development, saying that “Japan revives militarism again” or
“Japan shifts to the right.”
In this article, I will first describe Abe’s three pillars in detail in order
to show whether these are militaristic policies or not. I will explain that
Japan has no intentions to revive “militarism” again, but its goal is to
reinforce the Japan-U.S. alliance and keep the U.S. commitment to the
national defense of Japan. I will then point out the fact that problems
related to the Senkaku Islands triggered a change in Japanese society’s
perspective of national security from idealistic to pragmatic, but its stance
is calm and far from fanatic patriotism. I will clarify that, from a realistic
point of view, strengthening the alliance is the only rational alternative for
Japan in the short term. Due to the country’s budget limitations, it is not
realistic to expect Japan to increase its military budget as dramatically as
the PRC does. Another important fact is that economic relations between
Japan and China have vital meaning not only for Tokyo but also for
Beijing. I conclude with an explanation of why Japan also needs to work
on improving relations with the PRC.
Development of China’s Military Capability
The PRC has been developing its military forces rapidly both in
quantitative and qualitative aspects. The modernization of the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has occurred at an especially high speed.
It is analyzed that China recognizes that its naval force might play a
central role not only in achieving classical “gunboat diplomacy” or in
showing its national pride, but also in China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial
(A2/AD)” strategy. At the same time, the PRC seems to have its own
understanding of international law or rules of maritime activities and does
not share others’ common sense. Because of this, Chinese maritime
activities are a matter of concern for Japan and other neighbors.