Chapter Eleven
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and infrastructure (49.4%); incomes (40.5%); and, education, science and
technology (51.4%).
On the other hand, the numbers send a clear message concerning the
expected effects of Ukraine’s possible entry to the Eurasian Customs
Union. In this respect, only 19% of the respondents expect a positive
effect on the promotion of democracy and only 29.5% of them expect an
improvement within the realm of public services and infrastructure. In
terms of good governance, only 19.6% of the respondents are convinced
of possible positive effects of the Customs Union on the effectiveness of
the government. Nevertheless, 35.2% of the respondents showed
confidence in positive income effects, whereas 43.5% of the respondents
are convinced of positive economic development effects. A further 38.2%
of them expect an improvement within the fields of education, science,
and technology. From the survey, it becomes evident that the public
opinion in Ukraine is divided in terms of its expectations of the
comprehensive effects that might follow a possible entry to the Eurasian
Union.
However, when it comes to trade, it is yet not clear whether Ukraine
would profit more from European or Eurasian integration. If one compares
the export and import rates of Ukraine with the European Union on the
one hand, and with Russia as well as the CIS countries on the other hand,
it turns out to be a rather mixed picture. The Ukrainian import rates
amounted to 31%, as a percentage of the total with the European Union in
2012, and with Russia 32%, excluding another 8% with the CIS countries.
Further, the export rates with the European Union amounted to 25%, and
with Russia 26%, excluding another 11% with CIS countries.^47
Finally, one can note from today's viewpoint that Russia cannot offer
economic or political incentives, which would induce Ukraine to integrate
into the Customs Union or, respectively, into the future Eurasian
Economic Union. In the meantime there are clear political signals that
Ukraine will sign an association agreement with the European Union, as
well as a deep and comprehensive free trade area agreement, during the
summit on the Eastern Partnership at the end of November 2013.^48 For
this reason, Russia imposed strong pressures on Ukraine, such as price
determinations for energy, import prohibitions for several goods, and
other trade barriers against Ukraine before the upcoming summit on the
Eastern Partnership, in order to affect the Ukrainian decision to
(^47) Aslund, “Ukraine’s Choice: European Association Agreement or Eurasian
Union?”, 2.
(^48) The third Eastern Partnership Summit is scheduled to take place in Vilnius
between 28 and 29 November 2013.