Chapter Twelve
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possible for the government to actively pursue these policies as Congress
was composed of more traditional liberal-idealists and, arguably, even
some isolationists.
Roh Moo Hyun: US-South Korea
and China-South Korea Relations
During the first term of the Bush Administration, when US rhetoric grew
increasingly antagonistic towards the North, the South was simultaneously
working hard to maintain the fragile peace on the peninsula. When the
North left the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 2003,^17
it triggered the beginning of the Six Party Talks. Yet, despite the growing
tension, the South continued to pursue economic ties through the Sunshine
Policy, with President Roh Moo Hyun following in his predecessor’s
footsteps when he was elected in 2003. Roh expanded the Sunshine Policy
under his “Policy of Peace and Prosperity.”^18 The name alone is evidence
of Roh’s liberal standpoint.
Since the Bush Administration’s neo-liberal position remained strong
during most of Roh’s Administration, tensions between the two allies
caused the South to break with the US position in the Six Party Talks.
Instead, desiring a more moderate stance towards the North, in the hope of
maintaining détente and pursuing peaceful negotiations on a whole host of
other issues–such as family reunifications, trade deals and work at the
Kaesong Complex, tourism, and more–the South sided more with China’s
diplomatic position towards the North. During the Roh Presidency, the
South was particularly concerned that the Bush Administration’s neo-
liberal tactics could escalate tension on the peninsula, bringing the South
into a potentially violent conflict with the North, which it wanted
desperately to avoid. As a result, in 2005 President Roh and Chinese
President Hu Jintao met to solidify closer relations between the two
states.^19
For China, improving ties with the South meant it could pursue its own
neo-realist interests in North East Asia. From a constructivist standpoint,
China benefits most from treating both Koreas as allies, not least because
of the possibility of future reunification–which would pose a potential
(^17) Cho, “Collective Identity Formation on the Korean Peninsula: United States’
Different North Korea Policies, Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy, and United
States-South Korea-North Korea Relations.”
(^18) Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, 84, 202, 269.
(^19) Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, 75.