26 Chapter Two
strategy.^24 Furthermore, had China not been part of the BRICS, it is
questionable if India would have joined. Another point which places the
process in perspective is the fact that India also lobbies for UNSC reform
and is keen to become a permanent member of the UNSC–a scenario that
both China and Russia fail to support but which the US does.
China
China had by 2010 become the second largest economy in the world,
overtaking Japan. By maintaining its currency at low exchange rates it has
in recent years attracted high levels of foreign investment. For example, in
2011 alone the country received US$ 223 billion. The country has
maintained high economic growth rates: 13% in 2007, 9% in 2009, and
10.5% in 2010.^25
The country’s growth rate is linked to its exports. The global economic
crisis has impacted China and a slowdown in demand from the US
economy has forced China to reevaluate its growth strategy. The country
is in the process of shifting from, among others, investment led growth to
a more balanced consumption based model. These developments will
allow economic growth to reach an estimated 7.8% by the end of 2013.^26
China leads the BRICS. It has more relative capacity in GDP,
population, territory and foreign currency reserves than any other member
- BRICS nations hold foreign currency reserves of US$ 4.4 trillion, US$ 3
trillion of which are held by China.^27 Its economy is also larger than the
other four BRICS members combined. Furthermore, it has the ambition of
being a great power and an aim of challenging US power, but at the same
time wants to establish a privileged partnership with the US. Accordingly,
China seeks to limit and if necessary thwart other nations (including
BRICS members) who seek the same.
The country’s strategy towards BRICS is to integrate itself (and
BRICS) into the capitalist system, without taking any of the political
consequences. An additional asset for China is that BRICS partners have
different political systems from its own–most significantly because they
are democratic. This allows China to show the West that strong attachment
to sovereignty is not linked in any way to the nature of political systems.
This position extends to any attempts from outside China to interfere in its
(^24) Khilnani et al., “Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in
the Twenty First Century.”
(^25) http://data.worldbank.org/country/china
(^26) The Economist, 27 July 2013, 9-19.
(^27) Pretoria News, Business Report (6 September 2013), 1.