The Geopolitics of BRICS 27internal affairs with specific reference to human rights. This stance is not
because China is democratic but rather due to the fact that it believes the
protection of sovereignty is vital to a stable international order. In essence,
membership in BRICS allows China to share its stance on sovereignty.
Although China might be in an alliance with other BRICS countries, this
does not mean that it is willing to share its “assets of power” with them.
This attitude is best reflected in its opposition to more UNSC permanent
members, which would potentially include India, Brazil and South
Africa.^28 It would thus not seem ironic, in light of the above, to highlight
the perceived relationship within BRICS as described by Laidi as “a
curious coalition wherein members seek to neutralize each other in the
most strategic area of power.” The fact that China is the principal trade
partner of Brazil, India and South Africa reflects the level of power the
country maintains within the grouping as well as on a bilateral level. In
fact some cynics describe BRICS as a Chinese hub with four spokes and
the thinnest of rims in terms of economic relations amongst themselves.
Furthermore, many regard BRICS as a front for China. The PRC has
signed over 300 bilateral agreements on joint cooperation. The agreements
cover a wide area of economic relations, which shows that BRICS will
serve to further maximize China’s zone of influence.^29
As mentioned above, the BRICS countries do not share a common
political system but all have substantial internal asymmetries. South Africa
still has traces of apartheid racial discrimination and India has its caste
system, while Russia has an extremely asymmetrical society with a class
of wealthy oligarchs and numerous social inequalities–a situation that can
also be found in China.^30 Brazil also struggles with societal tensions which
include extensive drug abuse and criminality.
When the concept of geography is extended to include natural resource
endowments, China’s huge appetite seems limitless. The country’s
demand for strategic metals such as zinc, copper, iron ore and nickel
presently stands at 40% of global demand.^31 The country is also the
world’s second largest consumer of oil (10.28 million barrels a day) and
the second-largest net importer of oil as of 2009.^32
China’s dependency on strategically vital commodities imports will
fuel its already active (resource) diplomacy. Furthermore, this has already
(^28) Amorium, “Let’s hear from the New Kids on the block.”
(^29) Arkhangelskang, BRICS/IBSA Africa Relations: Turning the Threats to
Opportunities, 10.
(^30) Soto, “The Extent of China’s Relations with the BRICS Countries”, 38-41.
(^31) Jaeger, “Of BRIC Geography, Trade and Geopolitics”, 2.
(^32) US Energy Information Administration, “International Oil Consumption.”