Power Politics 53powers perpetually struggle over scarce security (see Hamilton, Rathburn
2013), and where the potential for conflict or even war is omnipresent. In
offensive neorealism, as well as in defensive neorealism, weaker states try
to check potential hegemons via balancing coalitions. However, in stark
contrast to defensive neorealism (represented by Waltz 1979 or Walt
1987), balancing is quite often ineffective since it is infested with the very
same problems as other collective actions (Mearsheimer 2001). The most
important implication is that states have no guarantee that–if attacked–they
will find help.
Nevertheless, offensive neorealism is, in the case of this chapter,
supplemented with geopolitical logic, which I would like to present in the
following paragraphs. Generally, we can say that there are three factors
determining the geopolitical situation in a region:
(i) the balance of power (the distribution of capabilities within the
region and possibly the presence of an extra-regional great-power);
(ii) the geographical configuration of a region; and,
(iii) technology.
The first two points will be discussed in the following chapters, but for
now I would like to discuss the main implications of the interplay among
different geographical contexts and military technology. Technology
affects the actual meaning of geographical configurations through its
ability to both modify the capability of military forces to exploit
opportunities by terrain or broader geographical configurations, and also
through different limitations exposed in specific geographical contexts.
With respect to the considered region and the fact that the rest of the
analysis deals with the upper-strategic level, I focus namely on the issues
of power projection on land and at sea (for a brief summary see table 1)
and problems of seaborne operations.
Generally it is possible to say that military operations on land are
manpower intensive and the role of technology is significantly limited by
terrain and vegetation cover (see Biddle 2004). Given this, power
disparities among nations are relatively unimportant. A smart plan
combined with superior tactical skills are more determinative (for a
victory) than sheer numbers or technology (see Biddle 2004). It is possible
to say that power projection on land may be cheap if there are no
significant adversaries. Nevertheless, it may be extremely problematic if
there are competent–even if they are weaker–adversaries. This is
demonstrated by the fact that land warfare is warfare by a large number of
relatively independent and evenly distributed small units (on modern
tactics see Biddle 2004, Nikitin 1982 etc.). It follows that the destruction
of several units may not be sufficient for a quick overall victory, unless