54 Chapter Four
there is a smart plan concerning how to exploit some partial tactical
success.
The sea is, on the other hand, a very different environment. It does not
offer plentiful opportunities for cover and concealment (one exception
being submarines). Furthermore, the sea demands that ships be relatively
large, which further reduces chances for concealment through the smart
use of terrain. It follows that sea warfare is extremely influenced by
technology and thus it is a rather capital-intensive kind of warfare. Thus,
technological and economical disparities among nations can co-determine
the winner of a conflict. On the other hand, a sea environment is
surprisingly conductive for power projection. Once a nation has built a
superior navy, it is possible to project power across large masses of open
sea. Large ships are big enough to operate for weeks without logistical
help. From previous statements it is easy to deduce that naval warfare is
usually determined by a relatively small number of highly sophisticated
and tightly cooperating units (see Gray 1999).
This description of sea warfare could lead us to conclude that large
masses of water are not in fact obstacles for power projection–a result
which contradicts the central claim of Mearsheimer (2001). Nevertheless,
the problem with power projection across sea is indeed present. However,
to better understand the issue it is a good to distinguish (i) the open sea,
(ii) the sea shore and (iii) land. On the open sea, the power projection is
quite easy for the superior navy. The problems emerge as we move toward
the shore. Here, diesel submarines and other ships, land based aircrafts,
and anti-naval guided rockets can operate. As we move into the coastal
waters (say within 30-50 miles from a shore), a defender has the
opportunity to engage his artillery and attack helicopters. Finally, at a
short distance from beaches, a defender can employ fire from tanks,
mortars, anti-tank weapons, and anvariety of small infantry weapons. The
land-based defender has several advantages over an approaching sea-based
attacker. The defender can disperse and conceal his units. If some units are
destroyed it does not necessarily mean destruction of one’s general
capability to defend the homeland. On the other hand, the attacker has no
choice but to concentrate his aircrafts on the deck of one or a few ships.
Therefore his vulnerability is paramount. Finally, the attacker, if he wants
to penetrate the shore and attack and conquer land targets, has to find a
place to disembark. The problem is that quite often these places (which are
appropriate for a massive seaborne operation) are rare, thus it is not
difficult to prepare a strong defense. Given that the attacker has to
concentrate his forces, he is extremely vulnerable, unless he is
significantly stronger than the defender (see also Mearhseimer 2001).