Power Politics 57in regional power competition. Second, the fact that there are peninsular
states means that these states, as well as China, have to carefully figure out
an appropriate share of their resources to devote to a particular branch of
military power.^5
Regional Implications
There are three basic geopolitical implications for the region. Firstly,
given the influence of sea power in the region, the most powerful nations–
China and Japan–will enjoy a superior position vis-à-vis other states.
Secondly, if small powers want secure their survival, they will be forced to
focus on the core missions–access denial (AD) and territorial defense of
the potential landing zones. Third, the double-commitment countries,
especially the smallest ones, will face difficult strategic choices in order to
find an appropriate balance of resources devoted to naval or land forces.
The key question, however, is what the aforementioned means for
security prospects of the region. Here we can distinguish among short-
term and long-term consequences. As far as the short term consequences
are concerned, we can infer several key points. Firstly, it seems that the
security of individual states (even Taiwan) will be relatively strong over
the next 5-10 years. This prediction is based on the fact that significant
masses of water provide a good defensive obstacle, if an appropriate
defensive doctrine is implemented by smaller states. Since naval (and air)
forces are extremely expensive, China will need several years to reach a
point of total dominance in the air and at sea. Unless this dominance
(combined with a sufficient number of landing ships) is reached, an
attempt at a quick and decisive seaborne operation–against Taiwan, for
example–may very well end in disaster. Moreover, the economic and
technological sophistication of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan means
that it will take a while for China to build a superior naval force capable of
amphibious operations against strongly defended shores. Further, massive
Chinese investment in naval forces would probably trigger an arms race
within the region, thereby most likely delaying Chinese military
superiority. Finally, China is a double-commitment country, so it is not
possible for her to focus exclusively on navy.
(^5) An attempt at building a strong navy may lead to a drain on resources necessary
for the development of land forces, which are essential for defending vital
interests. On the other hand, total primacy of land forces will leave the navy
without resources, thus offering China an easy way to dominate at sea and to (in
the long run) isolate individual states in the region.