58 Chapter Four
Earlier I used the term “appropriate strategy,” and before we move
forward it is important to explain this in more detail. In this regional
setting the appropriate strategy means a strategy of AD and territorial
defense. To acheive this strategy a nation has to focus on fighter and
fighter-attack aircrafts, as the key task of the air force is to inhibit and
deter an enemy’s air force and possibly to attack ships approaching the
land. Additionally, as far as the navy is considered, investment into anti-
ship rockets, diesel-electric submarines, and smaller blue navy vessels is
essential. However, the navy should tightly cooperate with land-based air
force and artillery. Finally, there must be a sufficient number of land
troops (with some heavy equipment) prepared to defend hypothetical
landing zones. This posture is clearly focused on the core territory and its
immediate surroundings. The goal of this approach is to establish the
strongest defenses possible within a limited radius. This defensive
posture–if combined with excellent tactical skills and modern technology–
can minimize chances of a sea-approaching attacker.
Nevertheless, this very reasonable posture creates serious problems in
the long-term future. Defensive (AD) doctrine–if adopted by the majority
of states facing China–will in fact inhibit the (intra-regional) emergence of
an effective counter-hegemonic alliance. The very nature of Access Denial
strategy means that armed forces involved in this kind of strategy lack the
ability, training, doctrine, and equipment to pursue long range operations.
While in compact regional systems (like Western Europe during the Cold
War) allies can prepare for defensive land operations and still support their
allies, this is not true in highly fragmented systems (like South East Asia),
where potential allies are separated by significant distances. Simply, forces
of lesser powers will lack the necessary capabilities to (i) attack mainland
China or (ii) directly help attacked allies. This is not an important problem
in the short term, as China is not yet able to conquer Taiwan or other states
without accepting enormous risks. However, Chinese economic growth
will enable China to build superior forces in the not-so-distant future and
then deal with her opponents sequentially. In the case of US non-
involvement in a potential crisis, smaller powers will remain without
significant external help–a prospect which forces one either to reconsider
the plausibility of resistance or to reconsider nuclearization. Further, a
dominant Chinese navy could blockade the area of operations, thus
effectively impeding any attempts by weaker navies from the region to
help the invaded state.
It is a bit paradoxical, but the key implication of the geographical
configuration of the region is that there are good prospects for survival for
smaller powers in the short term, however the very same factors enabling