Chapter Five
72
The following year, Taiwan decided to downgrade its military presence
on Taiping Island. By the year 2000, the Marine Corps stationed on the
island were replaced by the Coast Guard Administration, a civilian law
enforcement agency under the administration of the Executive Yuan.
There were many drivers behind this significant change: Taiwan military
leaders admitted that “the armed forces will not be able to defend the two
islands against an invasion since they are too far away from the Taiwanese
mainland,”^19 and therefore decided to take steps that would decrease the
provocativeness of its presence. The Coast Guard was seen as better fit to
carry out anti-smuggling and anti-piracy missions while attracting less
attention than military forces. The decision to shift control of Taiping
Island from the Marines to the Coast Guard Administration was heavily
criticized–as retreatist and as tempting the PRC into a military takeover of
the islands.^20 Military leaders, however, denied that they were giving up
sovereignty over the islands. To them, and many others, this readjustment
was necessary.^21 In their view, only a more comprehensive approach could
effectively strengthen Taiwan’s legal claim over the disputed territory.
This new approach broadened Taiwan’s options to expand civilian
activities in the Spratlys^22 –such as support for tourism activities, enabling
of economic development, and exploitation of natural resources. Taipei
also started to support visits by top government officials.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can therefore see a
shift from regarding the Spratlys exclusively in military terms to a more
comprehensive approach that emphasizes peaceful solutions. By using
tourism, emphasizing environmental conservation, building more
infrastructure, etc., Taiwan wanted to introduce a civilian aspect into its
territorial claims in the SCS to strengthen its sovereignty claim. In other
words, it decided to shift towards soft power, i. e. less provocative
strategies. This move can also be seen as a confidence-building measure.
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone is consistent with customary
internationational law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, to which
Taiwan is not a party as a result of its diplomatic status. However, as the DOS
report points out, “[p]rovisions on baselines and innocent passage deviate
significantly from those rules.” Similarly, the DOS reports that Taiwan’s
application of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf deviates
from the norm, particularly in cases of provisions on Taiwan’s rights and the
course of submarine cables.
(^19) Hsu, “Troops Withdraw from the Spratlys”, 1.
(^20) Hsu, “Tang Defends Troop Withdrawal from South China Sea”, 4.
(^21) Hsu, “Tang Defends Troop Withdrawal from South China Sea”, 4.
(^22) The same policy applied for the Pratas.