Chapter Five
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towards independence. In 2006, the Deputy Minister of National Defense
Tsai Ming-hsien admitted that, besides humanitarian assistance and
maritime security, which were publicly evoked by Taiwan’s representatives,
there were clearly strategic considerations behind the government's plan to
build the runway.^24 Last but not least, a tripartite agreement^25 for joint
marine seismic undertaking in the vicinity of Spratly Islands signed by oil
companies from China, Vietnam, and the Philippines may have played a
role in the decision to strengthen Taiwan’s position on Taiping Island.
At the same time, Chen Shui-bian continued to underscore the need for
peaceful resolution. In 2002, ten ASEAN countries and the People’s
Republic of China signed the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, in which they pledged to “resolve their sovereignty
disputes in a peaceful manner, without resorting to the use of force and
through direct negotiations among the countries concerned.”^26 While
Taiwan, given its complicated international status, could not become party
to such an agreement, President Chen still emphasized that Taiwan would
adhere to the principles of the Code of Conduct. Later on, during his 2008
visit to Taiping Island (on the occasion of the runway opening), he
articulated his so-called “Spratly Initiative,” in which he underscored the
importance of resolving territorial and jurisdictional controversies and
suggested that concerned countries agree to recognize the region as an
ecological protection area where the depletion of resources would be
forbidden.^27 Interestingly enough, Chen also proposed the establishment of
a research center for use by non-governmental organizations from all
claimant countries. Such a research center could then be used as a second
track diplomatic channel to discuss cooperation without the sovereignty
issue interfering.^28
With China’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea in the
second half of the 2000s, some Taiwanese politicians and academics
advocated an in-kind response and supported the strengthening of
Taiwan’s military installations on Taiping Island. What followed has been
a period of increasing Taiwan’s presence in the area and strengthening its
still limited military capabilities on Taiping Island. A stronger stance on
(^24) “MND Admits Strategic Value of Spratly Airstrip,” 2.
(^25) Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed Agreement on
South China Sea Cooperation, 14 March 2005, see
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm
(^26) “ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”
(^27) “President Visits Disputed Islands”, 1.
(^28) “President Visits Disputed Islands”, 1.