Taiwan’s Policy towards the South China Sea
77stationing of troops on the island, which has been operated by the Coast
Guard since 2000.^39
Taiwan has also been building its presence in the Pratas. Taiwan built
an airstrip^40 there and maintains a garrison of about 200 Coast Guard and
Air Force personnel. As John Tkacik has pointed out, the strategic value of
the Pratas is important, as the island is located right in the middle of the
Taiwan-Luzon-Hong Kong triangle and, therefore, most of the region’s
traffic must pass by it. From the PRC’s perspective, the extension of
China’s continental shelf so close to the Philippines is obviously also very
appealing. In 2007, in the context of its emphasis on sustainable
development, Taiwan announced the establishment of the Dongsha Atoll
National Park on the Pratas Islands, which is Taiwan’s seventh national
park.^41
China Reacts
China’s reaction to Taiwan’s reinforcement of its position on Taiping
Island has been interesting. While in recent years Beijing has shown
increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, its reactions to Taiwan’s
moves have been rather muted. In reaction to the Taiping Island airstrip
construction, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry laconically declared: “China has
indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and adjacent waters.
Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory.”^42 In other words,
from Beijing’s perspective, the PRC exercises sovereignty over Taiping
Island because it is, just like Taiwan, an integral part of China. Therefore,
any activities by Taiwan in the Spratlys are seen as ultimately benefiting
China and strengthening, though indirectly, its position in the South China
Sea. In Beijing’s eyes, under the “One China” policy, accepted by Ma
Ying-jeou based on the “1992 Consensus,” the territory controlled by
Taiwan strengthens Beijing’s claims. In defending Taiwan’s position,
Taipei in fact boosts Beijing’s position vis-a-vis the other claimants.
Beijing hopes that, in the future, the position now held by Taiwan will
complement or perhaps directly expand China’s ability to project power in
the South China Sea. Similiarly, in the eyes of the other claimants (who all
have diplomatic relations with Beijing and therefore respect the One China
(^39) Cole, “Taiwan’s Power Grab in the South China Sea.”
(^40) The Pratas (blog).
(^41) “Introduction to Dongsha National Park, Marine National Park Headquarters.”
(^42) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference, 5
February 2008.