Chapter Five
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policy), Taiwan is a part of China and its territorial claims therefore
reinforce China’s claims.
Interestingly enough, China has not challenged Taiwan’s possession of
territory in the South China Sea and there even have been suggestions
about possible coordination of policy or cooperation. Given Beijing’s
claims to the South China Sea, which overlap with Taiwan’s claims, the
solution of the Taiwan issue is crucial to China’s South China Sea
ambitions. Hypothetically, if a solution to Taiwan’s incorporation into
China (not necessarily the PRC) is found, no one could challenge China’s
claim to the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone generated
by Taiwan and the islands it now controls.
To underscore China’s claim, in June 2012, the State Council approved
the establishment of Sansha, a prefectural-level city that administers the
Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha (Spratly) Island groups and their
surrounding waters in the South China Sea. In July 2012, the PRC’s
Central Military Commission approved establishment of a military
garrison for the South China Sea in Sansha. The official sources justified
the establishment of the garrison with the following statement: the Sansha
garrison would be responsible for “national defense mobilization...
guarding the city and supporting local emergency rescue and disaster
relief” and “carrying out military missions.” This can be interpreted as yet
another move in asserting China’s sovereignty claims over the South
China Sea.
On multiple occasions, Beijing proposed joint cooperation with Taipei
in the South China Sea to defend China’s historical claim. For example,
Beijing suggested the joint development of oil and gas near the Pratas.^43
There have been precedents for similar cooperation in the past–such as the
cooperation on the exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the Taiwan
Strait. However, the Taiwan Strait is substantially different from the South
China Sea, as it involves only Taiwan and the PRC. In the case of the
South China Sea, Taiwan has carefully tried to avoid such proposals in an
effort to follow its own path, although domestically it does discuss the
pros and cons of cooperation and non-cooperation with the PRC.
The opponents of such cooperation usually see China as a threat to
Taiwan. Any form of cooperation would place Taiwan in a subordinate
position–China would never see Taiwan as an equal partner, and, in the
eyes of others claimants, Taiwan would then be seen as China’s proxy,
making Taipei’s efforts at negotiation difficult and its proposals for
(^43) “Stirring Up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses”, 12.