object into tactile, visual, and other sensory components, and then encoun-
ters a process of unification resulting in afixed composite image in
imagination rather than in afixed form external to perception.^76
Ibn al-Haytham confirms Mu’tazilite atomism, accepted by Ash’ari
thought, by showing from experiential experiment that“there exist small
bodies which cannot in any way be perceived by sight...for any visible
object, even a very small one, it is possible tofind among existing bodies
one which is smaller than the object and which is not sensible to sight.”^77
Considering objects on a larger scale, ibn al-Haytham conceives of form as
emerging from a composite of movements of the eye, through which each
point on the object links to the surface of the eye by a ray. These rays add up
to a geometrical cone of vision unified in the mind, which El-Bizri likens to
pointillism. This suggests that form is neverfixed:
When sight perceives an object whose form is then ascertained by the sentient, the
form of that object will remain in the soul and take shape in the imagination. And
the form of a repeatedly perceived object will be morefirmlyfixed in the soul than
the form of one perceived only once or a few times. And when sight perceives an
individual, then repeatedly and continually perceives other individuals of the same
species, the form of that species will be confirmed in the soul, and a universal form
of that species will thus take shape in the imagination.
...To imagine the forms of objects previously seen in the absence of these
objects at the time of remembering them, is clear proof that the forms perceived by
sight exist in the soul and are imprinted in the imagination.^78
The stable form is not external to us, but an illusion produced in the mind
through repetitive experience that leads to the idealized stability of form.
Whereas for ibn al-Haytham this mirror is the real world in which
“people see their own image,”for ibn Sina the mirror becomes a metaphor
for the distinction between perception of the external world and that of the
composite image on the inner imagination.^79 In his discussion of love, the
mirror is not a metaphor for how we perceive ourselves. It indicates world-
reflection, not self-reflection. Thus discourses that use the mirror, such as
the story of the competition between the artists (discussed inChapter 5),
never consider self-reflection. Rather, the mirror as metaphor enables the
reflection of one entire space (the external world) into another entire space
(the internal world/the space beyond the looking glass).
While ibn Sina and ibn al-Haytham follow Galen in locating the internal
senses in the composite sense, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali located these senses
(^76) Warren, 1966 : 278. (^77) Sabra, 1989 :9.
(^78) Sabra, 1989 : 208, 210, 211, 212. See also Necipoğlu, 1995 : 21. (^79) Smith, 2008 : 309.
The Science of Internalized Vision 127