14 Leaders The EconomistDecember 7th 2019
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o much talkof “crisis” has surroundednato’s 70th-birthday
year that it has been easy to forget there are reasons to cele-
brate. Not only has the alliance proved remarkably durable by
historical standards, but since 2014 it has responded aptly to
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, refocusing on its core mission of
collective defence. It has deployed multinational battlegroups
into the three Baltic states and Poland and committed to im-
proved readiness. Goaded by criticism from President Donald
Trump, its members have raised their spending on defence.
Though many countries, notably Germany, still fall short of their
promises,natonow estimates that between 2016 and 2020 its
European members and Canada will shell out an extra $130bn.
This new money helps explain one welcome development at
the meeting ofnatoleaders in Britain this week.
Mr Trump, previously the disrupter-in-chief,
who used to call the organisation “obsolete” and
caused consternation at a summit in Brussels in
2018 by threatening to withdraw if Europeans
failed to take on a fairer share of the burden,
has—however briefly—become a defender. In
London this week he blasted President Emman-
uel Macron’s criticism of the alliance as “nasty”
and “disrespectful”. He made no sign of blocking stern words on
Russia or the reiteration of Article Five ofnato’s treaty, the cor-
nerstone of the alliance. America’s commitment will be on dis-
play next year, when some 20,000 of its troops are to practise re-
inforcing Europe in an exercise called Defender 2020.
The bad news is that other disrupters have emerged. The vis-
cerally anti-natoJeremy Corbyn could conceivably become
prime minister of one of its leading members after next week’s
British general election. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan, has caused consternation by buying a Russian anti-aircraft
system, obstructingnato’s decisions on eastern Europe and in-
vading northern Syria without regard for his allies’ interests. He
responded with personal insults to a suggestion by Mr Macronthat, given Turkey’s actions in Syria, it might not be able to count
on the mutual defence enshrined in Article Five.
The most surprising troublemaker, and the reason relations
have turned ugly, is Mr Macron himself. In a recent interview
withThe Economisthe said thatnatowas experiencing “brain-
death”. He champions a stronger European defence, which Eu-
rope needs, and on December 4th insisted that this would “not
be an alternative tonatobut one of its pillars”. But there is lin-
gering suspicion of his intentions among other allies. That is
partly because of his enthusiasm for a “strategic dialogue” with
Russia. He has emphasised the threat of terrorism over the task
of defending against Vladimir Putin’s aggression. Mr Macron is
taking a long view and is seeking to stimulate fresh thinking, but
most of his allies understandably hear his
words as a threat to the progress of the past five
years (see Europe section). Russia’s actions, not
just in Ukraine but also onnatoterritory (in-
cluding by sending assassins to Salisbury in
Britain and, possibly, Berlin’s Tiergarten), call
for a strong response. Any desire for conces-
sions will be seen in Moscow as weakness.
In Britainnatopapered over the cracks. The
summit’s declaration affirmed its members’ commitment to Ar-
ticle Five and proclaimed that “Russia’s aggressive actions con-
stitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security”. That is welcome, but
the alliance needs to find a new strategic coherence. Even if Mr
Trump remains in favour, America’s focus is shifting ineluctably
to its rivalry with China in Asia and beyond. Exercises and in-
creasing readiness will cement the alliance at a military level—
and this will endure while the politicians come and go. Work on
newish areas such as space and cyberwarfare will help, too.
Eventually, a strategic dialogue with Russia might make sense.
But to thrivenatoalso needs a greater common purpose. Once
the impetus came from America. Mr Macron was right to point
out that in future Europe will have to play a larger part. 7The good, the bad and the ugly
New troublemakers emerge in the allianceNATO’s summitA
s many arab leaders have fallen in the past year as did dur-
ing the Arab spring. And still the wave of protests over cor-
ruption, unemployment and threadbare public services contin-
ues to sweep across the Middle East and north Africa. Turnover at
the top has not mollified the masses, because rather than pro-
ducing real change it has reshuffled entrenched elites. Particu-
larly in Iraq and Lebanon, many of the protesters now want to
tear down entire political systems. It is a dangerous moment. Yet
the protesters are right to call for change.
Both Iraq and Lebanon divvy up power among their religions
and sects as a way of keeping the peace between them. Lebanonconstructed a sectarian political system long before the civil war
of 1975-90, and buttressed it afterwards. Iraq’s system was set up
in 2003, after America’s invasion. It did not prevent Sunnis from
fighting Shias. But the civil war is over in Iraq, as in Lebanon. It
would seem risky to upset these fragile arrangements.
Leaving them be would be even riskier. Start with Iraq, where
America aimed to satisfy all groups but instead created a system
that encourages patronage and empowers political parties (and
militias) which entrench the country’s ethnic and sectarian divi-
sions. It is difficult to get ahead in Iraqi politics—or indeed in
life—without associating with one of these parties. They treatSystem failure
Time for Iraq and Lebanon to ditch state-sponsored sectarianismUnrest in the Arab world