52 Middle East & Africa The EconomistDecember 7th 2019
2“N
o to religionor sect,” cry the
protesters in Iraq. “No to Islam, no
to Christianity, revolt for the nation,”
echo those in Lebanon. Across the Arab
world people are turning against reli-
gious political parties and the clerics
who helped bring them to power. Many
appear to be giving up on Islam, too.
These trends are reflected in new data
from Arab Barometer, a pollster that
surveys Arab countries. Across the region
the share of people expressing much
trust in political parties, most of which
have a religious tint, has fallen by well
over a third since 2011, to 15%. (The share
of Iraqis who say they do not trust parties
at all rose from 51% to 78%.) The decline
in trust for Islamist parties is similarly
dramatic, falling from 35% in 2013, when
the question was first widely asked, to
20% in 2018.
The doubts extend to religious lead-
ers. In 2013 around 51% of respondentssaid they trusted their religious leaders
to a “great” or “medium” extent. When a
comparable question was asked last year
the number was down to 40%. The share
of Arabs who think religious leaders
should have influence over government
decision-making is also steadily declin-
ing. “State religious actors are often
perceived as co-opted by the regime,
making citizens unlikely to trust them,”
says Michael Robbins of Arab Barometer.
The share of Arabs describing them-
selves as “not religious” is up to 13%,
from 8% in 2013. That includes nearly
half of young Tunisians, a third of young
Libyans, a quarter of young Algerians and
a fifth of young Egyptians. But the num-
bers are fuzzy. Nearly half of Iraqis de-
scribed themselves as “religious”, up
from 39% in 2013. Yet the share who say
they attend Friday prayers has fallen by
nearly half, to 33%. Perhaps faith is in-
creasingly personal, says Mr Robbins.Some numbers behind the rage
Polling the Arab worldArabs are losing faith in religious parties and leadersFaith, less
Selected Arab countries, share of respondents, %Source: Arab Barometer *2016 †2013 survey asked about Muslim Brotherhood and 2019 survey about the Iraqi Islamic PartyLibyaIraq†JordanTunisiaEgyptAlgeriaTrust in Islamist partiesThose who say they are not religious2012-14 2018-1940200 8060 100LibyaTunisiaLebanonIraqAlgeriaEgypt806040200 100Trust in religious leadersIraqEgyptLebanonAlgeriaLibyaTunisia40200 8060 100Muslims who say they attend mosque at least
some of the timeEgypt
Algeria
Libya
Lebanon
Iraq
Tunisia0 20 40 60 80 100**violence. They want Iran and the militias it
backs to go away, too. Most of the public is
behind them. But they need the support of
influential people like Mr Sistani, who is- “It is for the people”, not the clerics, “to
decide what they perceive is most fitting,”
read his sermon on November 29th. That
was seen as a boost to the protesters, a shot
at Iran and its clerical rule, and perhaps a
signal that he wishes to withdraw from the
political fray. Some of Iraq’s clerics fear
provoking Iran, or losing credibility if the
government ignores their advice.
In spite of the killings, the protesters’
morale remains high. The demonstrations
have a carnival atmosphere in some cities.
But in others, such as Hilla, officials have
been chased out. The subtle messages in Mr
Sistani’s sermons do not satisfy everyone.
The ranks of the protesters are dominated
by young jobless men, some of whom prefer
throwing petrol bombs to peaceful march-
ing. “They run towards bullets,” says an ob-
server. Lately, armed tribesmen have pur-
sued vendettas against the security forces.
Things could get much worse. 7A
lmost immediatelyafter the govern-
ment of Iran switched the internet
back on, the stories started coming out.
Near the city of Mahshahr alone, the Islam-
ic Revolutionary Guards Corps sur-
rounded, shot and killed 40 to 100 protes-
ters in a marsh, witnesses told the New York
Times. Altogether, between 180 and 450
people are thought to have been killed by
the government during protests over a rise
in the state-controlled price of fuel last
month. About 7,000 people were detained
out of the hundreds of thousands who took
to the streets in all but two of Iran’s 31 prov-
inces. Not since the Islamic revolution in
1979 has the country experienced such
deadly unrest.
The regime responded to previous prot-
ests with more patience, letting people
vent for a few days before rounding up the
ringleaders. “This time they shot to kill, not
to intimidate,” says an academic from
Shahriar, a town where the protests flared.
Such was the perceived threat that the re-
gime’s hardliners and pragmatists put
aside their rivalries and worked together,
unleashing their respective security forces.
Their panic owes much to the make-up
of the protesters. Many came from the ur-
ban poor, whom the regime calls mostaza-
fin(downtrodden) and considers its base.
In 1979 they poured onto the streets to bring
down the shah; now their grandchildren
are turning on the clerics. Some middle-
class folk joined them on the streets for the
first time since 2009, when they protested
a suspicious election outcome.
Economic hardship, exacerbated by
American sanctions, is a big cause of the
anger. But many are also fed up with offi-
cial corruption. The public is turning so-
cial-justice arguments back on the clerics,
who are accused of milking the state. “The
ideological challenge is much more dan-
gerous than the economic challenge,” says
Pejman Abdolmohammadi of the Universi-
ty of Trento in Italy.
Official repression will deter many
from challenging the regime, but those
who do may become more violent. Some of
the recent protests turned into riots. In-
structions on how to make petrol bombs
circulate on social media. In some areas
people have begun taking up arms. The
uprising in neighbouring Iraq provides in-
spiration. “For Iraqis and Iranians it’s one
enemy,” says an exiled Iranian dissident.
“They’re fighting the same regime.” 7How a ruthless regime put down
economic protestsIranUnprecedented
violence