next iPhone was slated to be a modest release. Its physical design wasn’t
changing much, and its look and feel were going to be fundamentally the
same.
Though the rumors proved to be not quite accurate, it seemed like an
opportunity to forge ahead of Apple with a new Samsung phone packed
with features. The Galaxy Note 7, as it became called, was encased in an
eye-catching glass and metal casing, giving it a luxurious rather than cheap
plastic feel. Its large wrap-around screen with curved edges disguised an
eye iris security scanner, something the iPhone didn’t have. It also had a
water-resistant casing that could survive drops and spills—one of the
criticisms of the iPhone—and a faster-charging and longer-lasting battery.
Consumers had long desired more battery life, and D.J. wanted to use
that feature in the Note 7 to draw new consumers to Samsung. So the Note
was built with a 3,500-milliampere-per-hour battery, compared with the
3,000-milliampere the company had used in the previous model, giving the
Note 16 percent more battery life. Apple, meanwhile, had only a 2,900-
milliampere-per-hour battery in the iPhone 7 Plus.
Samsung Electronics settled on two suppliers. For its U.S. phones, it
tapped fellow Samsung affiliate Samsung SDI, one of the world’s largest
and most successful battery manufacturers.
In a uniquely South Korean arrangement, SDI was its own company on
paper but not its own company in reality. Samsung Electronics owned a
fifth of SDI, and SDI reported to the same ruling family under a complex
shareholding structure. SDI, in fact, was merely one corporation in a web
of cross-shareholdings and family ownership interests, tied together under
the massive Samsung Group. It consisted of more than fifty companies in
shipbuilding, fashion, advertisements, food courts, and a hospital. “The
Samsung Group” was often mistaken for a conglomerate. But “the
Samsung Group” was merely a term to express the way these firms are tied
together under a founding family.
For phones sold in China and elsewhere around the world, Samsung
turned to an outside supplier, Hong Kong–based Amperex.
Beating the iPhone to the market was essential to the company, and
Samsung’s executives demanded an accelerated deadline.
“We were sensitive to the iPhone’s release date,” a mobile manager
told me. “We wanted to beat them to [market]. Then we could get iPhone
customers.”