from illiterate women. This seems to contradict the central place often given to
education in empowering women in household, employment and fertility deci-
sions. During these years contraceptive use rose more steeply among illiterate
women than currently married and educated women. This was not just catching
up, as, by 2005/06, 10 out of the 17 major states had higher contraceptive use
among illiterate women than the average rate for all women (Bhat, 2002;
Arokiasamy et al., 2004; Arokiasamy, 2009). It is probably wrong to conclude
that female education is no longer important for reducing fertility. An indirect
influence of education is more likely. Uneducated women are likely being influ-
enced by the fertility behaviour of educated women; what could be called posi-
tive externalities at the community level (Arokiasamy et al., 2004). Increasing
school attendance by the children of illiterate parents is also likely to be impor-
tant. This suggests that couples have begun to reduce their family size in order
to invest more in child schooling and such aspirations have increased through
observation of the beneficial effects of education among wealthier others. There
is evidence of higher school enrolment and attainment of primary education
among children of parents who are using contraception (Bhat 2002).
The strength of the standard economic incentives in driving demographic
change can be seen in Africa. A study by Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) argued
that Sub-Saharan Africa would see a stubborn culturally-motivated resistance
to fertility decline. They suggested that a cultural-religious system sustained
and rewarded high fertility. In Europe and in Asia falling fertility has been
concentrated among women over 30, but in Africa the main contribution has
been among younger women. Studies showed a steep rise in the use of contra-
ception in Nigeria in the late 1980s, much of it linked to the campaign against
AIDs. Better education in Ado-Ekiti (South-west Nigeria) and Ghana from the
1980s led to a dramatic shift in the behaviour of single,and now better
educated, young women, who wished to postpone marriage and pregnancy to
consolidate their careers and earning capacity. In a context of widespread pre-
marital sexual activity the mechanism was both abortion and increased use of
modern contraception (Caldwell et al.,1992).
New findings from demographic and health surveys carried out in the early
1990s showed that birth rates had fallen substantially across much of West,
Central and Eastern Africa. The decline in Zimbabwe was dramatic, with a fall
in TFR of two children per woman in ten years. In Senegal fertility declined
due to a later age at first marriage. Survey evidence suggests that fertility in
Kenya started declining from a TFR of more than 8, from about 1960 in urban
and about 1968 in rural areas. Across 19 countries in Western, Eastern, Central
and Southern Africa there is clear evidence of fertility decline, mostly in urban
areas before 1975 and in rural areas about ten years later (Garenne and Joseph,
2002). Despite this ‘progress’ there is still a long way to go. In 2011 total fertil-
ity was 4.5 in Kenya, 6.0 in Nigeria, 5.0 in Senegal and 5.4 in Tanzania (World
Development Indicators,2013). There is little explanatory power in Sub-
Saharan Africa for income which was not growing during this period for much
of the region.
90 Sources of Growth in the Modern World Economy since 1950