April 2020, ScientificAmerican.com 67Naomi Oreskes is a professor of the history of science
at Harvard University. She is author of Why Trust Science?
(Princeton University Press, 2019) and co-author
of Discerning Experts (University of Chicago, 2019).OBSERVATORY
KEEPING AN EYE ON SCIENCEIllustration by Carlo Giambarresi
Scientists often complain that people are irrational in their
opposition to technologies such as nuclear power and genetical-
ly modified (GM) crops. From a statistical perspective, these are
very safe, and so (it is argued) people’s fear can be explained
only by emotion, undergirded by ignorance. Electricity from
nuclear power has led to far fewer direct deaths than has coal-
fired power, yet many people are afraid of it, and hardly anyone
is afraid of coal plants. Similar arguments can be made about
GM crops, which studies have shown are generally safe for most
people to eat.
Scientific illiteracy may be part of the problem. Most of us are
afraid of things we don’t understand, and studies have shown
that scientists tend to be more accepting of potentially risky tech-
nologies than laypeople. This suggests that when people know a
lot about such technologies, they are usually reassured.
But there’s more to the issue than meets the eye. It is true that
many of us fear the unknown, but it is also true that we can be
cavalier about routine risks. Part of the explanation is compla-
cency: we tend not to fear the familiar, and thus familiarity can
lead us to underestimate risk. The bipartisan commission that
reviewed the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill concluded
that complacency—among executives, among engineers and
among government officials responsible for oversight—was a
major cause of that disaster. So the fact that experts are unwor-
ried about a threat is not necessarily reassuring.
Scientists also make a mistake when they assume that public
concerns are wholly or even mostly about safety. Pope Francis, for
example, rejects genetic modification of organisms in part
because he views it as an inappropriate interference in God’s
domain; this is a theological position that cannot be refuted by
scientific data. Some people object to GM crops such as Roundup
Ready corn and soy because they facilitate the increased use of
pesticides. Others have a problem with the social impacts that
switching to GM organisms can have on traditional farming com-
munities or with the political implications of leaving a large share
of the food supply in the hands of a few corporations.
Geoengineering to lessen the impacts of climate change is
another example. Some concerns about geoengineering—not
just among laypeople but among scientists as well—have more
to do with regulation and oversight than with safety. Who will
decide whether this is a good way to deal with climate change?
If we undertake the project of setting the global temperature by
controlling how much sunlight reaches Earth’s surface, who will
be included in that “we,” and by what process will the “right”
global temperature be chosen?
Such considerations may help explain the results of a classic
study of perceptions of health risks from a polluted environment,
which showed that white women, as well as nonwhite men and
women, were substantially more worried about these risks than
white men. Because scientists are for the most part less worried
about risks than laypeople, we might conclude that the insouci-
ant white men are right and the others unnecessarily troubled.
Of course, the majority of scientists are white men, so it’s not
entirely surprising that their views track with those of the demo-
graphic group to which they belong. And there is a more impor-
tant point here: risks are not equally distributed. Women and
people of color are more likely to be the victims when things go
wrong (think the Marshall Islands or Flint, Mich.), so it makes
sense that they tend to be more worried. Moreover, women and
people of color have historically been excluded from important
decision-making processes, not just in science and technology
but in general. When you’re excluded from a decision-making
process, it is not irrational for you to view that process as unfair
or to be skeptical about what it yields.
Can we say whether men or women are more rational about
risk? Can we say which group’s view is closer to an accurate as -
sessment? Well, here’s one relevant datum: women are more like-
ly than men to wear seat belts.Who’s Rational
about Risk?
White men and scientists tend
to dismiss it most easily
By Naomi Oreskes
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