70 Finance & economics The EconomistNovember 16th 2019
I
n the vaultsof Monte dei Paschi di Si-
ena is a torn and yellowing sheet of pa-
per: a death sentence from the 15th century,
handed down for trying to steal gold from
what may be the world’s oldest bank. Mon-
te Paschi’s archivists now have another his-
toric sentence for their files. On November
8th a court in Milan convicted former exec-
utives for hiding vast losses from deriva-
tives transactions a decade ago, in collu-
sion with bankers from Deutsche Bank and
Nomura. It was one of the harshest penal-
ties imposed anywhere relating to the fi-
nancial crisis.
Thirteen people were convicted, in-
cluding Michele Faissola, Deutsche Bank’s
former global head of rates, and Sadeq
Sayeed, Nomura’s former chief executive
for Europe. Giuseppe Mussari, Monte Pas-
chi’s former chairman, received the heavi-
est sentence, of seven years and six
months. Deutsche Bank and Nomura were
fined a total of nearly €160m ($176m). Mon-
te Paschi, which was nationalised in 2017 as
its losses spiralled, had already settled.
Judges ruled that the former bankers
had hidden hundreds of millions of euros
at Monte Paschi between 2008 and 2012 us-
ing a “two-leg” bet on interest rates. This
flattered its current accounting position,
but led to several years of losses as it repaid
Deutsche and Nomura. Deutsche is review-
ing the ruling; Nomura has said it is con-
sidering an appeal. Giuseppe Iannacone, a
lawyer for the former Deutsche bankers,
said his clients would be appealing against
the “shocking” sentences.
Taxpayers who have stumped up for
three state bail-outs for Monte Paschi in
less than a decade may rejoice—at least
briefly; sentences in Italy are often cut, and
convictions overturned, on appeal. Never-
theless, these ones signal a shift in senti-
ment. Italian bankers used to be seen as
pillars of the community, not least because
of the community projects they funded. No
longer. In an ipsos poll published in Sep-
tember, Italians ranked bankers as among
the most untrustworthy professionals.
Part of the reason is scandal—at Monte
Paschi and, allegedly, several other banks.
Moreover, past reckless lending and politi-
cal interference have created a mountain of
problem loans, worth €340bn at its peak in
- Monte Paschi remains weighed down
by €14.5bn of bad loans, complicating the
government’s plan to sell its stake by 2021.
As the Milan court was reaching its ver-
dict, a group of lawyers met in Venice to
discuss the social costs of banks’ attempts
to rid themselves of bad debts and non-per-
forming loans. One of them, Andrea Ar-
man, has joined the populist Five Star
Movement—because of his anger at bank-
ers’ corruption, he says. He cites locals who
receive letters daily from debt collectors.
Matteo Salvini, the leader of the nativist
Northern League, who is plotting in oppo-
sition, also spies opportunity in popular
anger at the fallout. During a recent rally he
gave the stage to a retail-banking investor
who lost money after the crisis. Italian
bankers like to say their crisis is over. But
their clients—and the politicians courting
them—are not ready to move on. 7
MILAN
Stiff sentences for bank fraud capture a
sour public mood
Italy’s banks
The reckoning
continues
T
he best investors’ strategies often
sound simple. “Whether it’s socks or
stocks, I like buying quality merchandise
when it’s marked down,” says Warren Buf-
fett. Betting big on the fallout from epoch-
making events, like the fall of the Berlin
Wall, is George Soros’s preferred tactic. Jim
Simons, the founder of Renaissance Tech-
nologies, a hedge fund, spots patterns.
Mr Simons is less famous than Mr Soros
or Mr Buffett, but no less successful. He
founded Renaissance in 1982, aged 44, after
a successful career in mathematics and
code-breaking. Its flagship Medallion fund
has earned $100bn in trading profits since
1988, mostly for its employees. The average
annual return of 66% before fees makes Mr
Simons one of the most successful inves-
tors of all time. He is now worth $21bn.
A new book, “The Man Who Solved the
Market” by Gregory Zuckerman of the Wall
Street Journal, asks how he did it. It is a
compelling read. Mr Simons started invest-
ing in 1978 by looking for patterns in cur-
rencies. He had early successes with sim-
ple “reversion to the mean” strategies,
buying when a currency fell far enough be-
low its recent average. A decade later René
Carmona, another mathematician, con-
vinced him that rather than searching for
such patterns themselves, they should
hand over the job to an algorithm, and
trade even when the logic was unclear to its
human minders. In the 1990s Robert Mer-
cer and Peter Brown, formerly of ibm, de-
veloped a “self-correcting” version of this
trading approach that would double down
on successful strategies and cut losing
ones. These techniques, now called mach-
ine learning, have become widespread.
There were missteps along the way. Ear-
ly in his career Mr Simons unintentionally
almost cornered the market for Maine po-
tatoes, only realising when regulators rep-
rimanded him. For months the team strug-
gled to make money from trading shares,
until a young programmer spotted that Mr
Mercer had typed a fixed value for the s&p
500 index in one of half a million lines of
code, rather than getting the program to
use the index’s current value.
As Mr Zuckerman lucidly explains, such
strategies have limitations. One is that
their scale is limited. Medallion, which
trades on short-term price signals, has nev-
er held more than $10bn. The narrower the
time frame, the larger the market ineffi-
ciencies and the greater the chance that an
algorithm’s choice of trade will succeed.
But short-termism reduces capacity. Re-
naissance now has funds, open to outsid-
ers, that trade over longer horizons. But re-
turns have been less impressive.
Other firms now try to copy Renais-
sance’s trades. Insiders say it tries to trade a
pattern “to capacity”, moving prices so that
other firms cannot spot the same signals—
rather as if a bargain-hunter, upon learning
that a favourite shop was holding a sale, ar-
rived early and bought up the entire stock
so that no one else even realised the sale
was on. Others on Wall Street often de-
scribe Renaissance as a money-printing
machine, but Mr Zuckerman shows how it
has had to keep adapting its model to stay
ahead of the competition.
The book’s only disappointment is that
the man at the centre of it all features rela-
tively little. That is perhaps unsurprising.
Mr Simons studiously avoids publicity.
After all, keeping its funds’ strategies se-
cret is a big part of Renaissance’s success.
Having solved the market, he is hardly
about to give away his edge that easily. 7
Investing
Rich rewards
The Man Who Solved The Market.By
Gregory Zuckerman. Penguin Random
House; 359 pages; $30