mother – recalled: “We tried to use rope at
first, but in the end we hit her over the head
with stones. I was crying as I did it and she
was crying too.”
Among the notable fatalities were both
field commanders – Lieutenant General
Buckner was killed by a Japanese artillery
shell as he observed an American attack,
becoming the most senior US officer to die in
the war. A Japanese vice admiral also lost his
life, as did the celebrated war correspondent
Ernie Pyle, who had survived north Africa,
Italy and the D-Day landings only to fall to a
sniper’s bullet on a small island off the north
coast of Okinawa.
But even more than the appalling ferocity
of the fighting, it is the far-reaching conse-
quences of Okinawa that make it one of the
most significant battles in world history. On
18 June, with the Japanese resistance on
Okinawa all but broken, US president Harry
S Truman, in office for barely two months,
met his military chiefs to discuss Japan’s
unconditional surrender. The only way to
achieve this, said the US Army chief of staff,
George C Marshall, was to invade Japan’s
home islands with a force of 750,000 men, an
operation scheduled for 1 November. That
would be followed up by an even bigger
second invasion in the spring. Casualties
were impossible to estimate, said Marshall,
but given the huge number of men lost on
Okinawa, and the fact that the enemy would USMC-NARA/COURTESY OF NAVAL
HISTORY
AND
HERITAGE
COMMAND
NARA-80-G342629
TRUMAN’S DECISION
TO AUTHORISE THE
USE OF THE ATOM
BOMB WAS DIRECTLY
INFLUENCED BY
THE BLOODBATH
ON OKINAWA
The battle of Okinawa
Pain of battle
A US Marine guides a wounded Japanese
soldier from a blasted cave, 17 June
fight even more fanatically in defence of
Japan proper, it would be a “terrifying,
bloody ordeal” for the servicemen involved.
Was there any alternative to a ground
invasion? asked Truman. Yes, said assistant
secretary of war John J McCloy. To threaten
to use the newly developed atom bomb, and if
the threat was ignored, to drop it on a Japa-
nese city. “I think,” he added, “our moral
position would be better if we gave them a
specific warning of the bomb.”
When challenged by others that the bomb
might not go off, thus tarnishing America’s
prestige, McCloy responded: “All the scien-
tists have told us that the thing will go off. It’s
just a matter of testing it out now, but they’re
quite certain from reports I’ve seen that this
bomb is a success.”
Truman was encouraged by this, but said
no decision could be taken until they knew
the bomb would work. Planning would
continue for the invasion on 1 November. But
everything changed on 16 July when Truman
received word in Berlin, where he was
attending the inter-Allied Potsdam confer-
ence with Stalin and other leaders, that the
“first full scale test” of “the atomic fission
bomb” in the New Mexico desert had been
“successful beyond the most optimistic
expectations”. The memo added: “We
now had the means to insure [the war’s]
speedy conclusion and save thousands of
A merica n lives.”
Last sighting Lieutenant General
Simon B Buckner Jr (right), commander of
the US 10th Army, pictured moments before
he was killed by a Japanese shell while
observing an American attack, 18 June
mother– recalled:“Wetriedtouseropeat
first,butintheendwehitheroverthehead
withstones.I wascrying as I did it and she
wascryingtoo.”
Amongthenotablefatalitieswereboth
fieldcommanders– LieutenantGeneral
Bucknerwaskilledbya Japaneseartillery
shellasheobservedanAmericanattack,
becomingthemostseniorUSofficertodiein
thewar.A Japaneseviceadmiralalsolosthis
life,asdidthecelebratedwarcorrespondent
ErniePyle,whohadsurvivednorthAfrica,
ItalyandtheD-Daylandingsonlytofalltoa
sniper’sbulletona small island off the north
coastofOkinawa.
Butevenmorethantheappallingferocity
ofthefighting,it is thefar-reachingconse-
quencesofOkinawathatmakeit oneofthe
mostsignificantbattlesinworldhistory.On
18 June,withtheJapaneseresistanceon
Okinawaallbutbroken,USpresidentHarry
S Truman,inofficeforbarelytwomonths,
methismilitarychiefstodiscussJapan’s
unconditionalsurrender.Theonlywayto
achievethis,saidtheUSArmychiefofstaff,
GeorgeC Marshall,wastoinvadeJapan’s
homeislandswitha forceof750,000men,an
operationscheduledfor1 November.That
wouldbefollowedupbyanevenbigger
secondinvasioninthespring.Casualties
wereimpossibletoestimate,saidMarshall,
butgiventhehugenumberofmenloston
Okinawa, and the fact that the enemy would USMC-NARA/COURTESY OF NAVAL
HISTORY
AND
HERITAGE
COMMAND
NARA-80-G342629
TRUMAN’SDECISION
TOAUTHORISETHE
USEOFTHEATOM
BOMB WASDIRECTLY
INFLUENCED BY
THEBLOODBATH
ON OKINAWA
The battle of Okinawa
Painofbattle
A US Marineguidesa woundedJapanese
soldier from a blasted cave, 17 June
fightevenmorefanaticallyindefenceof
Japanproper,it wouldbea “terrifying,
bloodyordeal”fortheservicemeninvolved.
Wasthereanyalternativetoa ground
invasion?askedTruman.Yes,saidassistant
secretaryofwarJohnJ McCloy.Tothreaten
tousethenewlydevelopedatombomb,andif
thethreatwasignored,todropit ona Japa-
nesecity.“Ithink,”headded,“ourmoral
positionwouldbebetterif wegave them a
specificwarningofthebomb.”
Whenchallengedbyothersthatthebomb
mightnotgooff,thustarnishingAmerica’s
prestige,McCloyresponded:“Allthescien-
tistshavetoldusthatthethingwillgooff.It’s
justa matteroftestingit outnow,butthey’re
quitecertainfromreports I’ve seen that this
bombis a success.”
Trumanwasencouragedbythis,butsaid
nodecisioncouldbetakenuntiltheyknew
thebombwouldwork.Planningwould
continuefortheinvasionon1 November.But
everythingchangedon 16 JulywhenTruman
receivedwordinBerlin,wherehewas
attendingtheinter-AlliedPotsdamconfer-
encewithStalinandotherleaders,thatthe
“firstfullscaletest”of“theatomicfission
bomb”intheNewMexicodeserthadbeen
“successfulbeyondthemostoptimistic
expectations”.Thememoadded:“We
nowhadthemeanstoinsure[thewar’s]
speedyconclusionand save thousands of
A merica n lives.”
LastsightingLieutenantGeneral
SimonB BucknerJr (right),commanderof
the US 10th Army,picturedmomentsbefore
he was killedby a Japaneseshellwhile
observing an American attack, 18 June