286 Part 3 Group and Organizational CommunicationGroupthink
The Challenger disaster is often pointed to as a classic example of groupthink—a
problem in which group members strive to maintain cohesiveness and minimize
conflict by refusing to critically examine ideas, analyze proposals, or test solu-
tions (Janis, 1982). After the disaster, NASA engineers testified that the climate
at NASA made them reluctant to voice their concerns if they couldn’t back them
up with a full set of data (McConnell, 1987). Indeed, the Rogers Commission
(1986), which investigated the disaster, noted that had safety concerns been
more clearly articulated—and had NASA management been more receptive to
concerns raised by engineers from various departments—it is unlikely that Chal-
lenger would have launched that day.
As you learned in Chapter 8, engaging in productive conflict fosters healthy
debate and leads to better decision making. Unity and cohesion are important for
groups to operate effectively, but if these qualities are taken to an extreme—that
is, if they become more powerful than members’ desire to evaluate alternative
courses of action—the group can’t generate enough diverse ideas to make smart
decisions (Miller & Morrison, 2009; Park, 2000). This appears to have been
the case at NASA in the 1980s. In a more receptive group climate, a productive
conflict over the O-rings might have revealed the problems that the engineers
sensed but couldn’t quite voice specifically. The following are some symptoms of
groupthink that you should be aware of in your group interactions:c Participants reach outward consensus and avoid expressing disagreement so
as not to hurt each other’s feelings or appear disloyal.
c Members who do express disagreement with the majority are pressured to
conform to the majority view.
c Tough questions are ignored or discouraged.c Members spend more effort justifying their decisions than testing them.SOMETIMES VOICING
dissent is more important
than group unity. If the
engineers at NASA had
shared their concerns, the
Challenger disaster might not
have happened. © Bettmann/
Corbis