The Economist 14Dec2019

26 Europe The EconomistDecember 14th 2019

2 not to raise the retirement age but to rede-

sign the entire system. At stake therefore is

not just France’s ability to create a fairer

and more flexible pension regime, but also

Mr Macron’s reputation as a reformer who

does what he promises.

This week, the hard-line unions dug in

and vowed to stay on strike. Even the Con-

fédération Française Démocratique du Tra-

vail, a more moderate union which sup-

ports a points-based system, is now

furious because of the “equilibrium age”. If

he is to get his reform through, the unpop-

ular Mr Macron will have to rely on public

opinion. For now a majority of the French

continue to support the strikers, just as

they did in 1995. The longer the disruption

goes on, however, the more this support

could ebb. On day one, a massive 800,000

people, according to official figures, took to

the streets countrywide. By December 10th

only 339,000 turned out. The share of

teachers on strike dropped to 16% from

47%. By mid-week only 16% of all sncf

workers had downed tools, down from 56%

on the first day. Most metro lines in Paris

and most fast trains across the country,

though, continue to be shut down. The

strike could last a while yet.

A year after the gilets jaunes(yellow

jackets) protests, France remains restless

and suspicious. To this has now been add-

ed a further division, between the genera-

tions. “The baby-boomer generation bene-

fits from the current system, and wants to

avoid any pension reform at all costs,” says

Maxime Sbaihi of Génération Libre, a liber-

al think-tank. Those who have already

gained the most from France’s generous

welfare state look set to keep their rights to

enjoy one of the world’s most generous

pension systems. 7

Let the young support us

T

he opening ceremony of the Sochi

Winter Olympics in 2014 was meant to

be the defining moment of Vladimir Pu-

tin’s presidency, showing off a resurgent

Russia to the world and turbocharging his

popularity at home. With a price tag of

$50bn, he left nothing to chance. Russia

doped its athletes and trumpeted their gold

medals as though they were the spoils of

war. Whipped up by the state propaganda

machine, the celebration morphed into

anti-Western hysteria; and the Sochi Olym-

pics gave way, within days, to the annex-

ation of Crimea and the invasion of Don-

bas, in eastern Ukraine.

Six years on, the after-effects are catch-

ing up with the Kremlin. On December 9th

the World Anti-Doping Agency (wada)

banned Russia from major international

sport events for four years (see next arti-

cle). In a country where symbols matter

more than substance this ban, despite its

loopholes, comes as a huge humiliation. It

came on the day that Mr Putin sat down

with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelen-

sky, and the leaders of France and Germany,

to negotiate a settlement to the Russia-

sponsored war in Donbas that has claimed

13,000 lives.

The first “Normandy format” meeting

for three years was shrouded in apprehen-

sion, partly caused by Emmanuel Macron’s

new eagerness to build bridges with Rus-

sia. Would Mr Putin achieve his goal of

pushing Donbas back into Ukraine without

giving the government full sovereignty

over it, seen as a ploy to destabilise the

whole country? Would the French presi-

dent put pressure on Ukraine for the sake

of his own grand vision for a new European

security architecture? And would the neo-

phyte Ukrainian president cave in? These

fears drove thousands of people onto the

streets of the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, urg-

ing Mr Zelensky not to give ground.

The summit did not yield much, which

was in a way a relief: an agreement to ex-

change all prisoners, to disengage in three

additional areas along the conflict line, and

to meet again in four months’ time. But Mr

Zelensky also publicly drew some red lines.

There must be no sacrifice of Ukraine’s ter-

ritorial integrity, including Crimea, and

crucially, there must be no local elections

in Donbas until Ukraine has full access to

the occupied territory and regains control

over its border with Russia. That way, the

election might be fair, which it certainly

would not be if held now.

The contrast between the presidents

was striking. Mr Putin arrived in his mon-

strous armoured limousine, accompanied

by a suite of security men, some in balacla-

vas. Mr Zelensky rode in a Renault mini-

van. At the late-night press conference, Mr

Zelensky appeared young, nervous and

sincere. Mr Putin looked like an ageing au-

tocrat, vengeful, arrogant and bored. Hav-

ing set out to normalise his relationship

with Europe and isolate Ukraine, he

achieved neither. On the very same day, eu

foreign ministers agreed to start work on a

European version of America’s Magnitsky

Act—legislation that originally hit Russian

violators of human rights with sanctions.

In what was a terrible week for him, Mr

Putin also encountered resistance from

Belarus, a fellow Slavic country which is al-

ready part of an economic union with Rus-

sia. Tightening that union (and so, effec-

tively, taking over Belarus) might allow Mr

Putin to declare the creation of a new coun-

try that he could preside over after his pres-

idential term—the last the Russian consti-

tution permits him—expires in 2024.

But talks at Mr Putin’s Sochi residence

on December 7th produced nothing from

the Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukash-

enko. “We never intended and never will

become part of any other state—even the

brotherly Russia,” he said, before they be-

gan. The five-hour conversation ended

with nothing, other than an agreement to

meet again in two weeks’ time. And as soon

as Mr Lukashenko returned home, his

army’s top brass said that Belarus is willing

to take part in nato war games—to be

called “Defender Europe”—next year. That

will not have filled Mr Putin with Christ-

mas cheer. 7

Reverses on all fronts

Russia and Ukraine

Mr Putin’s awful

week

When Volod met Vlad