The Economist 14Dec2019

(lily) #1
The EconomistDecember 14th 2019 Finance & economics 63

2 arbiters to hear awkward disputes. This
should no longer be possible.
The shared vision of the Trump admin-
istration and Democratic lawmakers is
clearest when it comes to labour standards.
The aim was to make it less attractive to
move jobs from America to Mexico than
had been the case under nafta by support-
ing Mexican workers’ employment rights.
But in the first version of the usmca, the
afl-cio complained, the bar for proving a
breach of the rules was too high and en-
forcement mechanisms were too onerous.
Critics pointed to the only labour com-


plaint ever to make it as far as a formal dis-
pute as part of an American trade deal: a
case against Guatemala in which arbiters
agreed that the rules had been broken, but
not that any harm to trade or investment
had been demonstrated.
The new deal shifts the burden of proof
regarding such harm. To avoid penalties,
defendants will have to show that it did not
happen. Moreover, accusations that manu-
facturers are breaking Mexican laws cover-
ing freedom of association and collective
bargaining will be sent for speedy consid-
eration to panels of “independent labour

experts”. Rule-breaking will lead to penal-
ties on exports. Overall, the revised labour
provisions are good for Mexico, Mr Seade
says, and will reinforce its government’s
own labour reforms.
The revised usmca will restrict trade a
bit more than nafta did. It will probably
not live up to the hype. Even if greater use
of collective bargaining raises Mexican
wages, the usmca’s official impact assess-
ment suggests that American wages would
rise by just 0.27% in response. But for Mr
Trump, his Democratic foes and their
neighbours in Mexico, it counts as a win. 7

Buttonwood Dying many times


T


he firstquestion to consider in any
reckoning of South Africa is whether
you can get through it without a story
about Nelson Mandela. You can’t, of
course. So here is one that seems appo-
site. Mandela and his fellow prisoners on
Robben Island were allowed one book
other than the Bible. They opted for the
collected works of Shakespeare. Each
marked a favourite passage. Mandela
chose one from “Julius Caesar”: “Cow-
ards die many times before their deaths;
the valiant never taste of death but once.”
Fast-forward from the struggle
against apartheid to today. South Africa’s
economy has shrunk in two of the past
three quarters. The state-owned power
company has announced a series of
rolling blackouts. An unchecked budget
deficit means public debt is on track to
rise above 70% of gdp by 2022. The na-
tional airline has sought protection from
its creditors. The country’s investment-
grade credit rating is hanging by a thread.
The situation cries out for a valiant
response. Remedies have been discussed
ad nauseam. If the production of reform
blueprints were the key to wealth, South
Africa could be the world’s richest coun-
try. Instead it suffers an unending series
of small deaths. It is why, for many in-
vestors, it is often a tactical trade but
never a strategic one. It is a reform story
endlessly sketched out but never written.
The need for fixes is increasingly
desperate. This year will be the fifth in
which gdp growth has failed to keep up
with population growth. The unemploy-
ment rate is 29%, a grim statistic that
does not fully capture the extent of job-
lessness. One legacy of apartheid is that
many blacks live far from where the jobs
are. Since poor public transport makes
searching for work costly, many simply
drop out. The trouble runs even deeper.

South Africa is a cartelised country, in
which insiders—big businesses and their
employees; government workers—flour-
ish and outsiders languish. Labour laws
intended to reduce inequality have instead
reinforced it. Wage deals are fixed by un-
ions and big firms. Small firms must com-
ply, but struggle to do so. Startups and the
jobless suffer as a result.
The fixes are well-rehearsed: an end to
restrictive labour practices; a dose of
competition in industry; a clean-up of
state-run power-transmission and trans-
portation monopolies. Countless commis-
sions and development plans have urged
such measures. In its annual health-check
of South Africa’s economy in 2018, the imf
concluded that “bold structural reforms
are urgently needed”. It was hardly a new
message. In 2011 the fund had deemed
reforms “critical”; by 2013 they were “im-
perative”; by 2016 “urgent and imperative”.
But little has changed.
The wonder is that these simmering
problems have never boiled over. A system
of welfare grants helps contain some of the
population’s anger, but weighs on public

finances. South Africa is thus vulnerable
to a shift in investors’ mood. It runs a
persistent deficit on its current account.
It relies on overseas capital to bridge this
gap between what it spends and what it
earns. Ideally this would come through
foreign direct investment, which would
add to the country’s capital stock and
create jobs. But it is hard to attract such
investment when you do not have a
reliable power supply.
So South Africa relies on portfolio
inflows to stocks and bonds. It has had
enough residual appeal to keep these
coming. It has a range of well-run com-
panies that are not especially sensitive to
the struggles of the local economy, says
Rob Marshall-Lee of Newton Investment
Management. Oligopoly in many in-
dustries makes for handsome profit
margins. Bond investors, with one eye on
the country’s credit rating, are able to
earn higher yields than are available
elsewhere. There is still confidence in
South Africa’s key institutions, says
Yacov Arnopolin of pimco, a big bond
firm. The central bank has stuck to its
task of controlling inflation. The Trea-
sury has shrewdly extended the average
maturity of public debt to 13 years, which
buys the country a bit more time to deal
with its problems.
The buying of time seems to have
become an end in itself. There is still a
great deal of goodwill towards South
Africa among the money-men. The
memory of Mandela still evokes respect
and admiration. But the management of
money involves a cold-eyed calculus.
Investors are tactical on South Africa;
they will buy if the gloom seems over-
done or the rewards eclipse the risks,
even if barely. Few are valiant enough to
be outright bullish. They do not wish to
taste of career death even once.

Why it is hard for foreign investors to be bullish on South Africa
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