2 PARIS, 1937: COLONIAL QUESTIONS AND PEACE 177colonies, the British had decided, largely at Chamberlain’s urging, to make
no specific reference ‘to the transfer of colonial territories on the impor-
tance of which Dr. Schacht has insisted, except in so far it is stated that it is
not intended to exclude any `proposals from discussion.’ This was not only
because Britain and France would first have to work out the details of a
colonial offer,...but mainly because there could and would be no prospect
of colonial concessions to Germany unless the British and French political
requirements were met by Germany; so that if the negotiations failed, it
would be over Germany’s refusal to meet these requirements rather than
the refusal of colonial concessions....[C]olonial concessions ‘could only be
contemplated if they were accepted by Germany as a full and final settle-
ment of all her territorial claims, and if thereby a permanent basis could
be found for European appeasement’....The danger to the whole world,
including the people of Africa, was so great that almost any effort must be
made to avoid it. The prospects did not look good, but if colonial conces-
sions would bring Germany back to the family of nations, especially by the
maintenance of the independence of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the abandonment of German ambitions for an eventual attack
on the Soviet Union, the price—as perceived from London and Paris if not
from Douala and Lomé—would be worth paying.^315Whatever hope was vested in the planned talks with Schacht, it was
soon apparent to London and Paris that he had no authority to discuss
political matters on behalf of Berlin.^316 Indeed, Neurath told Sir Neville
Henderson and André François-Ponçet, the British and French ambassa-
dors at Berlin respectively, ‘that the colonial question was of no impor-
tance and merely Schacht’s hobby.’^317 In connection with this, it should
be noted that according to a New York Times report, a meeting between
Neurath and François-Ponçet in December 1937 would end ‘upon
a note of high tension,’ because the former told the latter ‘straight out
that the colonies question would, if necessary, be decided by the argu-
ment of force.’^318 This last observation aside, Schacht’s lack of authority
(^315) Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933– 1939 , 342–3.
(^316) Ibid., 340–1, 345.
(^317) Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933– 39 , 345.
(^318) Augur, ‘Reich would Risk War for Colonies, Neurath Indicates,’ New York Times,
December 7, 1937. See also Wood, Peaceful Change and the Colonial Problem, 142n. ‘The
Reich’s capital experienced tonight its first mass meeting for the return of German colo-
nies. It demonstrated chiefly that Berlin is not particularly excited about colonies. For the
first time since the National Socialists came to power the whole balcony in the Sportpalast