2 PARIS, 1937: COLONIAL QUESTIONS AND PEACE 179Europe by offering colonial and economic concessions encouraged him to
take greater risks in a course of continental expansion which would, among
other things, pave the way for what Hitler expected would be a later and
even greater German colonial empire.^320Despite what Neurath told Henderson and François-Ponçet, Schacht
was not the only minister of the Reich whose hobby was colonial revi-
sion. Maroger maintained that the ‘personal attitude of one of the prin-
cipal authorities of the new Reich in matters of foreign policy,’ namely,
Ribbentrop, had been decisive in rendering the colonial demand as one
of the principal demands in the international politics of Germany.^321
Having stated this, Maroger observed the following: ‘It seems that in the
entourage of M. Von Ribbentrop people have very strongly hoped to obtain,
thanks to some amiable negotiations, some important concessions in regard
to primary materials and colonies.’^322 According to Maroger, this hope
was encouraged by the fact that Hoare, Ribbentrop’s partner during the
conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935, had
raised the problem of the redistribution of raw materials in Geneva in
September of that year.^323
However, as Maroger suggested, Ribbentrop and his circle were
interested in much more than the economic dimension of the colonial
question.^324 As Maroger pointed out, the principle merit of the policy of
issuing colonial demands was its ‘suppleness’: although the acquisition of
colonies was certainly desirable it was not ‘strictly indispensable for the
Reich’ and thus the demands could be, depending on the circumstances,
‘accentuated or withdrawn, or at least attenuated.’^325 Importantly
in respect to the view that such demands were intended above all to
serve as diplomatic leverage, Maroger observed that while their suc-
cess would prove ‘profitable,’ their ‘sacrifice, at least partial, cannot be
without benefits.’^326 Elaborating on the latter point, Maroger pointed
out that since the end of the war Germany had been in a fundamentally
(^320) Ibid., 357–58.
(^321) Maroger, La question des matières premières et les revendications coloniales, 25–6.
(^322) Ibid., 26. Emphasis in the original.
(^323) Maroger, L’Europe and the question coloniale, 217–18.
(^324) Maroger, La question des matières premières et les revendications coloniales, 9.
(^325) Ibid., 26.
(^326) Ibid.