3 CONFERENCES AT PRAGUE AND BERGEN AND THE LOOMING WAR 279highlighted in this regard was apposite, since Europe was about to witness
what was intended as another territorial fait accompli. Condliffe declared
that he thought he knew ‘every decision and every fact and every point of
discussion in the sanctions controversy against Italy, except one important
decision: why in London and in Paris and other world centres the decision
was taken at the critical moment not to impose effective sanctions. This
decision,’ he stated emphatically, ‘was not taken at Geneva.’^131
The theme of economic interdependence and its centrality to world
peace was touched on frequently throughout the conference. It was a
theme pursued most especially in a memorandum prepared on the invi-
tation of the conference by the economist Michael A. Heilperin enti-
tled International Monetary Organisation. Therein, Heilperin observed
that the monetary system which had been reconstructed in the 1920s
had not been able to withstand the impact of the 1929–1930 crisis and
the subsequent economic depression. The failure of what Salter called
the ‘first effort,’ Heilperin explained, brought to the surface the forces
of economic nationalism which had been operating ‘behind the scenes’
throughout the 1920s. Heilperin maintained that it was no exaggeration
to suggest that these forces had lingered: although the project of post-
war reconstruction had rested ‘on the assumption of a lasting peace,’
states remained ‘suspicious of one another’s intentions, while the fear of
another war lurked in the background all the time’.^132
With the onset of the Depression, political nationalism became more
vocal, fuelled by public resentment concerning the decline in living
standards and rising levels of unemployment. Economic and political
nationalism further intensified, Heilperin observed, as a result of the fail-
ure of the World Monetary and Economic Conference of July 1933 and
the stalemate and ultimate collapse of the disarmament negotiations.^133
Heilperin dismissed as simplistic the notion that economic policies can
bring about peace: that peace can be bought through liberalising trade.
He stated that in any case, such a policy was impossible given current
world conditions: the world was then ‘torn’ by aggressive nationalism
(^131) International Studies Conference, Twelfth Session, Economic Policies in Relation
to World Peace: A Record of the Study Meetings Held in Bergen from August 26 to 29,
1939, 58–9, IICI/9/23, UA.
(^132) Michael A. Heilperin, International Monetary Organisation (Paris: International
Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1939), 41–2.
(^133) Ibid., 41.