288 J.-A. PEMBERTON
enable them to disarm.’^163 I say partly because in making this statement,
Shotwell was alluding not only to the maintenance of peace through
sanctions. In the same context, he insisted that in order to disarm fears,
one must in addition to establishing security mechanisms,
erect and strengthen and fortify the institutions of international under-
standing—not only those of justice, but those that lead toward justice;
confidence, diplomacy, and all those institutions in which the gathering
storm of disagreement may be dissolved by a reasonable understanding of
what the other party wants.^164In order to illustrate this point, Shotwell offered criticism of the United
States’ approach to its relations with the Far East. He complained that
the American attitude towards the region remained that of the ‘mission-
ary’: the United States was determined to ‘save their souls somehow in
the Far East without responsibility or risk’ to itself.^165 Shotwell went
on to state that the organisation of peace, a matter on which he would
advise the State Department during the war in helping it to plan the
structure of the United Nations, called for much greater international
institutional developments than the League of Nations ‘gave us a glimpse
of.’^166 Reflecting his functional orientation and also his background in
intellectual cooperation, Shotwell emphasised the need for institutional
developments in the non-political fields, that is, in the economic, social
and technical fields. He stated in relation to this the following:
(^163) Shotwell, ‘International Organization,’ 22–23.
(^164) Ibid., 23.
(^165) Shotwell, ‘International Organization,’ 23. Harold Josepson records that Shotwell
was sympathetic to the Chinese claims in relation extra-territoriality and at the IPR’s con-
ference in Kyoto in 1929, had sought to find a compromise between China’s insistence
that extraterritoriality violated its sovereignty and the American, British and French unwill-
ingness to accept its ‘unilateral termination’. In regard to the question of Manchuria, while
‘admitting the validity of some of the Japanese claims,’ Shotwell ‘thoroughly abhorred the
method chosen’. At first, he had accepted the Hoover-Stimson Policy of ‘watchful-waiting
in the hope that more liberal forces in Tokyo would regain control of the government’.
However, in December of 1931, recognising that this policy would not work, Shotwell
called for the United States to ‘strongly assert the validity of the Kellogg Pact and the
Nine-Power Treaty.’ Harold Josepson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in
America (New Jersey: Associated University Press, 1975), 182, 193.
(^166) Shotwell, ‘International Organization,’ 23. For Shotwell’s advisory role, see
DeBenedetti, ‘James T. Shotwell and the Science of International Politics,’ 392.