378 J.-A. PEMBERTON
Nations in the hope ‘that such a body will bring about greater unification
and closer cooperation in the formulation of a more effective war strat-
egy, a clearer understanding of war aims and a more regular exchange of
views in the post-war world for which we are fighting and working.’^104
Sze pointed out that the Chinese further hoped that such a body would
serve as the basis for the development of international instruments for
the provision of justice and, as Soong had suggested a few weeks earlier,
lay the groundwork for collective security in a post-war world.^105
Soong’s proposal should be viewed in part against a background of con-
cern about the inadequacies in the existing machinery for consultation in
respect to the administration of the war. This concern had seen China plead
for an increased presence in the higher war councils. Like several other
Allied countries, China protested against ‘excessive Anglo-American dom-
inance in the conduct of the war’: as stated by both Chinese and Indian
members at Mont Tremblant, the administration of the war was ‘not nearly
democratic enough to correspond with the concept of “equal partner-
ship.”’^106 While the question of national prestige was implied by such criti-
cism, the conference proceedings suggested that the two main motivations
behind it was the desire to better coordinate the war effort on all fronts and
to ensure that all members of the United Nations were afforded the oppor-
tunity to fully participate in international post-war planning.^107
In connection with the motivation which was the desire to better coor-
dinate the war effort, it should be noted that Chinese members were keen
to stress against the background of the loss of Burma, the importance
of the China front in the general strategy of the United Nations. They
argued that the failure to appreciate its importance on the part of the
American and the British authorities meant that urgently needed supplies
were not finding their way to China.^108 In connection with the motiva-
tion relating to post-war planning, it should be noted that Sze observed
at the conference that the Chinese were very keen to see some of the
(^104) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, ‘A Chinese View of China’s Position in the Post-War World,’ in
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, War and Peace in the Pacific, 18–20, 23.
(^105) Ibid., 19, 23.
(^106) William L. Holland, introduction to International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations, War and Peace in the Pacific, 2, and International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations, War and Peace in the Pacific, 21, 75.
(^107) Ibid., 21–22.
(^108) Ibid., 30–31, 33–34.