4 INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION IN WAR-TIME AND PLANS ... 379ideas underlying the statement jointly issued by Roosevelt and Churchill
on August 14, 1941, by which he meant the Atlantic Charter, with the
intention of making ‘known certain common principles in the national
policies of their respective countries on which they...[based]...their hopes
for a better future for the world,’ translated into practice ‘at an early
date...before there...[was]...a chance for them to become cold.’^109
It became evident during an introductory discussion concerning the
problems of war and peace that affected the Pacific as a whole, that few
participants in the conference were disposed to discuss the conduct
of the war in a strictly military sense: it was not military strategy that
excited their interest but rather political strategy. An important feature of
the discussion of political strategy that took place at the conference was
the question of the need for regional coordination in respect to infor-
mation services. While the need for strict censorship of information that
might be of assistance to the enemy was not disputed by anyone, some
felt that a lack of candour in several of the countries in the region ‘had
led to an unhealthy and even dangerous growth of “grapevine” chan-
nels of information and rumour, which, it was said, tended to undermine
morale.’^110 There was strong agreement among members on the need to
coordinate the propaganda produced by the United Nations, although
in connection with this the following question was raised: what could
the peoples of the Pacific possibly be told by their governments in order
to raise their morale when the United Nations had yet to decide on the
post-war future of the region?^111
Once this question was raised, the discussion of the topic of politi-
cal strategy seamlessly lead into a discussion of the topic of the future
of colonial policy. As stated by Astor in his role as chair of the RIIA in
the foreword to the preliminary report of the conference which was
published by the RIIA in 1943, the latter topic ran through ‘the warp
and woof ’ of the conference’s discussion in general.^112 In response to
the question concerning the post-war future of the Pacific region, it was
suggested that as a first step, information should be widely diffused by
(^109) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, ‘A Chinese View of China’s Position in the Post-War World,’ 18.
(^110) International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, War and Peace in the Pacific,
20, 23.
(^111) Ibid.
(^112) Waldorf Astor, foreword to International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
War and Peace in the Pacific, iii.