4 INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION IN WAR-TIME AND PLANS ... 393Nonetheless, Corbett must have thought that there was something to
be said for the minority view as he contended that the real reason why
the League had not proved to be an effective political body was that it
was a ‘superstructure without foundations’: in the end, however much
people wanted peace and a just distribution of the world’s resources,
they were not willing to sacrifice ‘the advantages or illusions of national
sovereignty.’^168 Corbett considered that the peoples of the world were
still not willing to make such a sacrifice which was why, in his view, the
governments at Dumbarton Oaks could not be accused of betraying
their peoples in failing to go down the federal path and create a supra-
national body. Such a body, he advised, was the only assured means of
maintaining peace between small and great powers alike.^169
Corbett noted that it was commonly thought that the participation
of the United States might be a guarantee of the success of the collec-
tive security machinery of the new organisation then under construc-
tion. However, he pointed out that as it now seemed certain that the
major powers would retain the right of veto accorded to them under the
Dumbarton Oaks Agreement irrespective of the objections of smaller
powers the obligation of the United States to use force in order to main-
tain peace would ‘always depend wholly on their willingness to do so
at the moment.’^170 Although favouring the adoption of a rule whereby
the major powers would give up their right of veto in respect to disputes
to which they were party as was the case under the League, Corbett
thought that all the evidence pointed in quite the opposite direction.^171
Having accepted Corbett’s view that the Dumbarton Oaks plan was
an imperfect but workable instrument, the conference’s round tables on
collective security proceeded to focus on what were perceived to be its
most serious flaws, chief among these according to members being the
aforementioned veto and the inadequate role the plan accorded small
and middle powers.^172 Criticism was also voiced of the composition of
the military forces that the plan proposed to place at the disposal of the
world security organisation. An Australian member with the enthusiastic
support of a Chinese member, suggested that the plan be modified so
(^168) Ibid.
(^169) Ibid., 100–1.
(^170) Ibid., 101.
(^171) Ibid., 102.
(^172) Ibid., 104.