394 J.-A. PEMBERTON
as to provide for an international force, preferably, in the form of an air
force at least at the outset. The same member pointed to the success of
combined operations during the war, adding that these operations set a
precedent for an international military arm.^173
Military members, however, expressed the view that the Dumbarton
Oaks plan ‘provided all that was necessary by way of an alert and mobile
force’.^174 One of the several arguments that they advanced in object-
ing to an international force under the jurisdiction of the UN Security
Council was that a force which ‘has no national roots fights under no
nation’s flag’ would lack ‘the necessary esprit de corps’ and might
‘attract merely adventurers and mercenaries.’^175
Certain members argued in response that ‘the ideals and practical
objectives of a world-wide security organisation would provide incen-
tives fully as appealing as those under which soldiers now give their lives
throughout the world.’^176 In connection with this, it was pointed out
that recent public opinion polls showed that on being asked whether
they were in favour of an international police force, seventy-four per cent
in Great Britain, seventy-four per cent in America and seventy-eight per
cent in Canada had responded in the affirmative. The conference pro-
ceedings noted that the general impression left by the discussion of the
question of an international force was that having listened appreciatively
to views of the military experts, a majority of the lay members remained
convinced that to equip a world security organisation ‘with its own air
force would imbue the conception of international action with a reality
and a personality that otherwise might be lacking.’^177
Although members differed on the exact treatment of the Japanese
imperial structure and the Zaibatsu, there was ‘very general agreement’
on the following policies toward Japan: that Japan must surrender
unconditionally; that Japan’s overseas empire must be dismantled; that
the Allies must remain united in ensuring that Japan was kept disarmed;
and that an economically sound Japan was desirable subject to the pro-
viso that the economic well-being of other Pacific countries be given
(^173) Ibid., 115–16.
(^174) Ibid., 116.
(^175) Ibid.
(^176) Ibid., 117–18.
(^177) Ibid., 118.