4 INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION IN WAR-TIME AND PLANS ... 399in colonial countries and had ‘greatly benefited the welfare of the
people.’^203 In response, an Indian member stated that one must simply
accept that ‘the urge to self-expression which is one of deepest needs of
every nation must be given full sway,’ adding that the desire for free-
dom was an essential element of this urge and that no material gains can
‘compensate for the loss of freedom.’^204 Noting that Japan had cleverly
exploited the felt-need of Asiatic peoples to uphold their self-respect, the
same speaker suggested that Allied propaganda should embrace without
hesitation ‘the principles of freedom and human equality’ as this was the
only way that the United Nations could ‘gain the whole-hearted and
enthusiastic and unreserved support of the nations of Asia.’^205
The exploitation of ‘“interracial grievances” by Japanese propagan-
dists’ was examined by the two round tables convened to discuss how
the war had affected cultural and race relations and how these relations
might be improved.^206 Although the members of these round tables
agreed that Japanese propagandists had made clever use of these griev-
ances both before and during the war, the effectiveness of the Japanese
effort to establish a united anti-Western front in Asia was questioned on
two grounds. First, it was pointed out that the Japanese treatment of
peoples in occupied areas in the region, that is, ‘their enslavement of men
and rape of women—had weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the
arguments which correlate[d] oppression with white domination.’^207
Second, it was pointed out that in its propaganda, Japan, for obvious
reasons, had not dared stress the right of subject peoples to political inde-
pendence or to revolt against oppression.^208 Irrespective of the last two
points, the members of one of the round tables were in full agreement
that the United Nations ‘should as soon as possible issue a joint declara-
tion of policy repudiating every kind of racial discrimination’ with a view
to reassuring Asiatic peoples of the intentions of the Allied powers.^209
(^203) International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, Security in the Pacific, 16.
(^204) Ibid., 17.
(^205) Ibid.
(^206) Ibid., 76. See also Belshaw, preface to International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations, Security in the Pacific, v.
(^207) International Secretariat, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Security in the Pacific, 76.
(^208) Ibid.
(^209) Ibid.