80 J.-A. PEMBERTON
the Manchurian crisis’ and had now been ‘in part denounced.’^243 Wright
observed that the Far Eastern powers had generally preferred to make
use of genuinely international machinery for the settlement of contro-
versies, citing in this context the covenant and the Pact of Paris. This
was also the case, he added, with Latin American countries when it came
to disputes of a grave nature. Wright stated that it may be that regional
organisation has ‘inherent deficiencies’ when it came to maintaining
peace, adding that that if ‘moral opinion’ were to be ‘the main sanction’
in international affairs, this would most definitely be the case. Wright
proffered the view that ‘the united opinion of the world was none too
much in difficult international disputes’ and argued on this basis that it
seemed inadvisable to divide action, such as naming the aggressor and
imposing sanctions, between regional and world organisations. To divide
action in this way, he maintained, would likely confuse public opinion
which would then lack ‘the definiteness and unanimity’ that is needed
in order to achieve results.^244 Although insistent that collective secu-
rity must be organised on a universal basis for it to be effective, Wright
allowed that regional organisations, could be useful for certain purposes,
suggesting, for example, that such organisations could serve as forums
in which possible adjustments to the status quo in the region were
discussed.^245
On the question of the membership of a hypothetical organisation
for the Asia-Pacific region, Wright noted that the main actors in the Far
East were China, Japan and the USSR, although he added that Siam
(Thailand) and India might be also be mentioned in this regard. He
then noted that as the push for self-determination in different parts of
the region advanced, Korea, the Philippines Islands, Indochina and the
Dutch Indies might also participate. Perhaps in an anticipation of the
defence of Manchukuo that Japanese members would mount at Yosemite
(Manchukuo being the puppet-state that Japan had established in the
wake of its invasion of Manchuria and which remained subject to the
principle of non-recognition of ‘the fruits of unlawful aggression’ as pro-
nounced on January 7, 1932, by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
(^244) Ibid., 425.
(^245) Ibid., 426.
(^243) Ibid., 412.