1 PEACEFUL CHANGE OR WAR? 85broke up, it should have been evident to all, according to Holland and
Mitchell, that the LON’s collective security system had collapsed.^259 In
light of this collapse, Wright’s remark in the paper he submitted to the
1936 IPR conference to the effect that it seemed as if moral opinion was
now to be the main sanction in world affairs, might be accorded the fol-
lowing significance: the toppling of the LON’s collective security system
in conjunction with American isolationism meant that meant that when
it came to sanctioning unruly states there was little left to reach for in the
international armoury than moral condemnation. Although it did not
prevent him from expressing the hope that confidence in collective secu-
rity might be restored, Wright evidently believed that the moral sanction
was not a negligible thing: it was not a pretend sanction. That said, he
would have known that confidence in this form of sanction was also at
a low ebb. It was certainly at a much lower ebb than it had been when
Stimson first presented to world the moral weapon which was the doc-
trine of non-recognition of the spoils of aggression.^260
(^259) Ibid., 1.
(^260) Wright, ‘The Working of Diplomatic Machinery in the Pacific,’ 431–2.