41
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Gorbachev attends a rally in East
Berlin celebrating the 40th anniversary
of the G.D.R. in October 1989
Germans, in managing unification, to
respect the feelings of other peoples as
well as their own interests.
We were not alone in our concerns.
The Federal Republic of Germany’s (F.R.G.) NATO allies—
France, Great Britain, Italy—did not want a quick reunifica-
tion. I understood that from my talks with their leaders. In each
of the countries that had suffered from aggression, there were
fears—as though in their very genes—that the unification of
F.R.G. and G.D.R. would increase Germany’s power. They had
serious, though unspoken, historic and
political reasons for such fears.
I think that NATO’s European mem-
bers would not have been averse to using
Gorbachev to put a brake on unification.
But I understood that resisting a process
that was objectively inevitable and, even
more so, to use force in any form could
lead to unpredictable consequences: an
explosion in the center of Europe, a resumption of the Cold War,
and who knows what else! It was the duty of all of us to avoid that.
today, reading some comments and reminiscences of that
time, one might get the impression that the process of reunifi-
cation was a cakewalk, that everything came like manna from
heaven, or that it all happened as a result of happy chance or
even naiveté of some parties. But that was not the case.
The two plus four negotiations involving the two German
states, the Soviet Union, the U.S., France and Britain could not
be an easy ride. There were contentious discussions and clashes
of opinion, and it sometimes seemed that misunderstanding
would doom the negotiations.
But they ended in success, because
the parties to this complex diplomatic
process showed foresight as well cour-
age and a sense of high responsibility.
Yet, when I am asked who I regard as the main hero of that time
of drama and turmoil, I always reply: the people. I am not deny-
ing the role of the politicians. They were very important. But it
was the people—two peoples—who mattered the most. The Ger-
mans, who declared their will for national unity decisively and,
most importantly, in a peaceful way. And
of course the Russians, who understood
the Germans’ aspirations, who believed
that Germany had indeed changed and
supported the will of the German people.
Russians and Germans can be proud
that after the war’s tragic bloodshed they
understood each other. Had they not,
the Soviet government would not have
been able to act the way it did.
We drew a final line under the Cold War. Our goal was a new
Europe: a Europe without dividing lines. The leaders who suc-
ceeded us have failed to achieve that goal. A modern security
architecture, a strong mechanism for preventing and resolving
conflicts have not been created in Europe. Hence the painful
problems and conflicts that beset our continent today. I urge
world leaders to face up to those problems and resume dialogue
for the sake of the future.
Gorbachev, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was the only President
of the Soviet Union
When asked who I
regard as the main hero
of that time of drama
and turmoil, I always
reply: the people
JANSSON/ULLSTEIN BILD/GETTY IMAGES
