The EconomistMarch 28th 2020 Middle East & Africa 432
1bert Zeufack, the chief economist for Africa
at the World Bank.
In some countries such as Malawi,
where most people subsist by growing
their own food, the economic impact of co-
vid-19 may be relatively small. But in many
others, the clampdowns on economic life
are adding to the pain. Restrictions on
movement and commerce will be especial-
ly harmful to workers in the informal econ-
omy—that is, most of the African labour
force. Roughly 85% of workers do not re-
ceive a regular reported wage.
On March 21st Rwanda closed its border
with Congo. The livelihoods of petty trad-
ers who buy food in one country and sell it
in the other are in peril. In Goma, on the
Congolese side, Naomi Sifa sits with a pile
of bananas a few metres from the desolate
frontier. By selling them in Rwanda she
would normally make 3,000 francs ($1.77)
each day, just enough to feed her family. No
longer. “If they keep the border closed, they
will kill people with hunger,” she says.
The economic consequences of co-
vid-19 have not escaped African epidemiol-
ogists. For John Nkengasong, director of
Africa cdc, a public-health body, the virus
could be a “national-security crisis first, an
economic crisis second, and a health crisis
third”, if the responses are not calibrated
appropriately. That does not mean letting
the disease rip, but it does mean “commu-
nity engagement” and careful monitoring
of knock-on effects on poverty and the
treatment of other diseases.
African authorities will probably strug-
gle to shut down cities to the extent seen in
Europe, never mind China. For the mo-
ment, though, they are trying to combine
restrictions on movement with some steps
to ease the economic pain. The Seychelles,
for example, has pledged salary guarantees
for private-sector employees for three
months. South Africa has announced a tax
holiday for businesses to encourage them
to keep paying workers, and its central
bank is extending credit lines to keep firms
afloat. Senegal aims to spend about 6% of
gdpfeeding people and helping firms, butit must appeal for funds to do so.
No country is able to match the sums
being spent in the West. Social safety nets,
where they exist, tend to support old peo-
ple and mothers, not the jobless. Cash
transfers would be the quickest and most
efficient response to avert mass poverty. So
far, in response to the covid-19 crisis, 69
countries globally have introduced, adapt-
ed or expanded social-protection schemes.
Yet in sub-Saharan Africa only South Africa
and Kenya have done so.
The lack of action is in large part be-
cause African countries do not have
enough money to do more. Between 2010
and 2018 average public debt in sub-Saha-
ran Africa rose from 40% to 59% of gdp, the
fastest increase of any developing region.
More than half of African countries are
above the imf’s recommended limit for
public debt. The World Bank says that 29
out of 47 African countries need to tax
more than they spend just to keep their
debt constant as a share of the economy.
But their tax revenues are about to plum-
met and the cost of borrowing is soaring as
investors flee to safety.
A fiscal response on the scale seen in
the rich world would require outside help.
Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister,
has asked the g20 for an emergency pack-
age worth $150bn to boost health spending,
shore up foreign reserves and patch up so-
cial safety nets. He wants the World Bank’s
investment arm to tide over African com-
panies hit by disruptions to global supply
chains, for the imfto increase its lending
to poor countries and for existing debt to be
rolled over or forgiven.
The West’s response may determine its
relationships with African countries for
decades. If the rich world declines to help
more, China will probably dominate the re-
sponse. Mr Ma’s gift may soon be followed
by economic assistance, which could ce-
ment China’s position as the main partner
for many African countries.
Other political consequences of co-
vid-19 will soon become clear. One may be a
rise in xenophobia. Ethiopia and Camer-
oon, among others, have seen attacks on
foreigners or their property. Autocrats such
as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni or Mr Magu-
fuli may take advantage of a distracted
world, and find covid-19 a convenient rea-
son to delay elections or arrest dissidents.
What will ultimately determine the fate
of leaders on the continent, though, is how
they combine their direct response to the
virus with mitigating its vast indirect costs.
Mr Ramaphosa has largely been open, deci-
sive and bold. But even he will struggle to
maintain public support as he tries to en-
force a long lockdown. African countries
face an unenviable task, which they cannot
address alone. In trying to “flatten the
curve” of the number of infected, they risk
crushing their people. 7Down, down, down
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502019 2020Dec Jan Feb MarI
f you believethe official numbers, co-
vid-19 has not yet hit the Middle East and
north Africa as hard as the rest of the world.
Excluding Iran, where an outbreak is rag-
ing, the virus has killed around 100 people
in the region, compared with thousands in
Europe (which has more people). Never-
theless, Arab leaders are taking drastic
steps to curb its spread, imposing curfews,
closing businesses and quarantining cit-
ies. This is wise: countries such as Italy and
Iran delayed action and were over-
whelmed. It is also troubling. The region’s
regimes have long played on people’s fears
to justify their authoritarian rule.
Many governments have declared states
of emergency, allowing leaders to rule by
decree (as many do anyway) and deploy the
armed forces. In Egypt, for example, the
army has been sent out to disinfect areas.
In Jordan it now guards public squares and
helps enforce a ban on people leaving their
homes. With the civilian authorities in Iran
unable to cope, the Revolutionary Guards
have sought more power and pushed for vi-
rus-related restrictions. In some Western
countries, too, the army is out in the
streets. But regimes in the Middle East and
north Africa are less likely to loosen their
grip on society once the crisis recedes.
They are also clamping down in ways
not seen in the West. Morocco has detained
people for rumour-mongering. “Those
spreading fake news will be pursued,” saysStates are clamping down. Will they
loosen up when the crisis is over?The virus in the Arab worldAn even tighter
grip