Special Providence_ American Foreign Policy and How It Changed World - Walter Russell Mead

200 SPECIALPROVIDENCE

factrepresentedtheU.S.answertothestrategicdilemmaofitsfirstfifty
years.GivenbasicBritishrespectforAmericaninterestsandterritorial
integrity(anattitudeenforcedbyBritain'sfearsofpoliticalisolationby
acombination ofconservative Continental states, and strengthened
byBritishappreciationforthefightingqualitiesoccasionallyexhibited
byAmericanforces intheWarof1812),theUnitedStateswouldno
longerhesitate.Itwasbettertocome toanarrangementthatwould
strengthenBritainontheseasthantosupporttheeffortsofContinental
powerstolimitBritishpower.
Therationaleforthisstepwasclearin1823,andonlybecameclearer
astheUnitedStatesgrewsteadilystrongerthroughthenineteenthcen-
tury.IfBritaineverweakened,theContinentalpowerswouldhavebeen
onlytooeagertotakeadvantageofLatinAmerica'sprevailinganarchy
andweaknesstointerveneandcarvenewempiresforthemselvesinthe
NewWorld.ThefearofEuropeandynasticadventuresinLatinAmerica
was anything butfanciful. The Portuguese royal house ofBraganza
maintainedagriponBraziluntiltheoverthrowoftheemperorDom
PedroIIin1889.France,Spain,Prussia,Russia,andAustriasupporteda
BourboFlrestorationaftertheCongressofVienna.Spaindidnotrecog-
nizetheindependenceofPeruuntil1879.MostoftheLatinAmerican
statesweresoweakandsobadlygovernedduringmuchofthistimethat
without foreign protection they would have faced greatdifficulties
defendingtheirindependence.
Forallitsarroganceandambition,Britainwas,Jefferson,Adams,and
Monroeagreed,a saferpartnerthananyoftheContinentalstatescould
be.AlthoughmanyoftheobstaclespersistedthathadcausedJeffersonin
the1790StogagattheHamilton-Jaypolicyofanunderstandingwith
Britain,by 1823 anunderstandingwiththemothercountrywas the
leastbadoption.Leta BritishratherthananAmericanfleetpolicethe
watersofLatinAmericaagainstthepowersofEurope.LetBritainguar-
anteetheindependenceofLatinrepublics,withtacitAmericansupport.
Preservingitsfreedomofaction,theUnitedStatescouldenjoymostof
thebenefitsofa full-fledgedalliancewithBritain,whileleavingBritain,
forreasonsdictatedbyitsowninterests,topayalmostallofthecost.
With thisgreatstepdecided, andwiththestrategic relationship
betweenthetwocountriesmoreorlessdetermined,Jeffersonianpolitics
inthenineteenthcenturydiditsbesttopalliatethecostsofthenew
policywhileextractingeverypossibleounceofbenefit.
Froma Jeffersonianpointofview,thechiefdefectofthenewpolicy