Special Providence_ American Foreign Policy and How It Changed World - Walter Russell Mead

262 SPECIALPROVIDENCE

make,theinstitutionstheywishtobuild,andthesocialandeconomic
policiestheywishtopromotedonotenjoyJacksoniansupport;insome
casestheyelicitviolentJacksoniandisagreement.Thisrepeatedlyputs
HamiltoniansandWilsoniansinanawkwardposition.Atbesttheyare
tryingtopushtreaties,laws,andappropriationsthrougha sulkyand
reluctantCongress.Atworsttheyfindthemselvescommittedtomilitary
confrontations withoutJacksoniansupport. Moreoften thannotthe
militaryactivitiestheywishtopursuearemultilateral,involvinglimited
warfareorpeacekeepingforces.Theseareoftenunpopularbothinsidethe
militaryandinthecountryatlarge.Caughtbetweentheircommitments
(andthewell-organizedHamiltonianandWilsonianlobbiesandpres-
suregroupswhosepoliticalcloutis oftenatleastpartiallyresponsible
forthesecommitments)and themanifestunpopularityoftheactions
requiredtofulfillthem,Americanpolicy makersdither,tackfromside
toside,andgenerallymakeanunimpressiveshow.Thisisoneofthe
structuralproblemsofAmericanforeignpolicy,anditisexacerbatedby
thedividedstructureoftheAmericangovernmentandSenatecustoms
andrulesthatgivea determinedoppositionmanyopportunitiestoblock
actionofwhichitdisapproves.
Thesecondproblemhasa similaroriginbuta differentstructure.
Jacksonianopinionisslowtofocusona particularforeignpolicyissue,
andslowerstilltomakea long-termcommitmenttopursuea given
policyvigorously. Oncethatcommitmenthas been made,itis even
hardertobuildJacksoniansentimentfora change.Thisisparticularly
truewhenchangeinvolvesovercomingoneoftheingrainedmentalpref-
erencesinJacksonianculture:Itis,forexample,muchhardertoshifta
settledhawkishconsensus ina dovishdirection thanvice versa. The
hardesttaskofallistomaintainsupportfora policythateschewsappeal-
ingbutperhapsinappropriatesimpleanswersintheinterestofmore
"complex"approaches.HavinggottenJacksoniansintoa warinVietnam
orthePersianGulf,itisveryhardtogetthemoutagainwithoutsatisfy-
ing total-victoryconditions. Once RedChina orVietnamhas been
acceptedasanenemynation,itisverydifficulttobuildsupportfornor-
malizingrelationsor,worsestill,extendingforeignaid.
Theseproblems,whichareresponsibleformanyoftherecurringsys-
temcrashesandunhappystalematesinAmericanforeignpolicy,cannot
befullysolved.Theyreflectprofounddifferencesinoutlookandinterests
inAmericansociety,anditisthejobofourinstitutionstoadjudicate
thesedisputesandforcecompromiseratherthantoeliminatethem.