Special Providence_ American Foreign Policy and How It Changed World - Walter Russell Mead

268 SPECIAL PROVIDENCE

canpowerhadbeenformedduringtheVietnameraorwhosawwhat
YalehistorianPaulKennedycalledthedangersof"imperialoverstretch"
toAmericannationalinterests.Jacksonianstrengthlay amongmili-
taryintellectuals;agroupofinfluentialcommentators,intellectuals,and
columnists;politicalscientistsrevivingtherealisttraditionininterna-
tionalrelations;conservativethinktanksliketheHeritageFoundation;
andtheCongress,wherekey senatorslikeJesseHelms,a Republican
fromNorthCarolina,becamechairmanoftheSenateCommitteeonFor-
eignRelationsfollowingtheRepublicanvictoryinthe 1994 elections.
WiththeendoftheColdWar,thefourschoolsshiftedintoa new
configurationclosertothe 19 I9-4I alignmentthantotheColdWar
pattern.HamiltoniansandWilsonianswerewhatwecancallglobalist,
believingthattheconstructionofa globalorderwasthefundamental
taskofAmericanforeignpolicy.Thetwoglobalistschoolsthoughtin
1989 asin 1919 and 1945 thattheendofa majorinternationalconflict
createda valuableopportunitytobuilda newworldorder.Forthese
schoolsthecollapseoftheSovietUnionmeantanunparalleledopportu-
nitytoachievelong-heldkeyAmericangoals,andtheendoftheCold
Warwasthesignalfora vastandsystematicintensificationofAmerican
politicalandeconomiceffortsaroundtheworld.For Wilsoniansthishad
todowithpromotingtheruleoflaw,thespreadofdemocracy,andthe
constructionofa genuineinternationalconsensusagainstaggressionand
fortheprotectionofhumanrightsbyinternationalpoliceactions,and
eventhecreationofa permanentarmedbodyatthedisposaloftheUN
SecurityCouncil.ForHamiltoniansitmeanta uniqueopportunityto
developa worldwide tradingandfinancesystembasedontheunchal-
lengedmightofAmerica'smilitaryforcesandonthedynamismofits
economy.
Theothertwoschools,JeffersoniansandJacksonians,opposedeach
otheronmanyissuesbutunitedbehindthebeliefthatglobalismwent
toofar.Thesenationalistschoolsalsointerpreted 1989 thewaytheyhad
interpreted 1919 and1945:Theendoftheglobalconflictmeantthatthe
UnitedStateshadtheopportunitytoreduceitsinternationalcommit-
ments.Thiswasnota fullreturntotheisolationismofthetwentiesand
thirties;mostparticipantsintheforeignpolicydebateagreedthatthe
UnitedStateshasvitalinterestsbeyonditshemisphere.However,the
nationalistcampbelievedthatthenationalinterestwasbestservedby
pursuingless ambitiousandfar-reaching projectsthantheglittering
globalistvisionsofa newworldorder.Some,particularlythoseopposed