Special Providence_ American Foreign Policy and How It Changed World - Walter Russell Mead

272 SPECIALPROVIDENCE

theAmericanpeople.BothLeftandRightalsojoinedtoattacksuchpil-
larsoftheHamiltonianeconomicagendaas theIMFandtheWorld
Bank.
ThefailureofHamiltonianpolicytogainmorepopularsupportin
theUnitedStatesis,atfirstglance, inexplicable.From 1982 through
2000 theUnitedStateswitnessed,backtoback,twoofthethreelongest
economicexpansionsinitshistory,punctuatedonlybytheveryshortand
mildrecessionof199°-91(blamedonanoilpricejumpfollowingIraq's
invasionofKuwait).2 Ininflation-adjusted (1996)dollars,real GDP
grewfrom$4.9trillionto$9.I trillionbetween 1982 and1999;3the
totalfinancialassetsofAmericanhouseholdsgrewfrom$.12.6trillionto
$29trillion4inthoseyears..TheriseinAmericanexportsduringthe
1990Splayeda majorroleinkeepingtheexpansionhealthy;sotoodid
thereductionininflationmadepossiblebyopentrade.Inthepastmany
analystsnotedthatothereconomicexpansionswerecurtailedwheneco-
nomicdemandtaxedAmericanfactoriesandlabormarketstothebreak-
ing point; uncontrollable, demand-driven price increases generated
inflationarypressuresthatultimatelybroughttheexpansionstoa halt.In
the1990S,however,overseasgoodstookthepressureofftheAmerican
economy,allowinga blisteringpaceofeconomicgrowthtocontinue
withoutthepricepressuresthathadprovedsocostlyinthepast.
Underthecircumstances,onemighthaveexpectedAmericanparents
tobenamingtheirchildrenNaftaandGattratherthanparticipatingin
protestmarchesagainstinternationaltradeagreements. Butthepro-
foundpoliticalproblemsoftheHamiltoniantradeagendareflectboth
theeconomictransitionthroughwhichthecountryhaspassedinthelast
generationandtheeffectsofthattransitionontheviewsandgoalsof
Americanbusiness-onthestructureofHamiltonianopinion.
Thewrenchingtransition from an industrial to a post-industrial
economywas the mostimportantdevelopment inAmerican society
between 1970 andtheendofthetwentiethcentury.Thiseconomicrevo-
lutioncreateda difficultpoliticalcontextforHamiltonianpolicymak-
ers,andbroughtfundamentalchangestotheattitudesoftheAmerican
corporatesector. Unfortunatelyforthosepolicymakers,manyofthese
changesservedtoreducepublicsupportforHamiltonianpolicyonthe
onehand,andontheothertoweakenthetiesbetweenAmericanbusi-
nessandthenationalgovernmentthathadlongbeenthecentralconcern
ofHamiltonianthinking.
Popularoppositionto Hamiltoniantradepolicyhas beenwidely