Special Providence_ American Foreign Policy and How It Changed World - Walter Russell Mead

TheRiseandRetreatoftheNewWorldOrder 297

jeffersoniansandjacksoniansdidnotsurrender.Withincreasingenergy
andresourcefulnesstheybegan tochipawayatthedominantpolicycon-
structsandinstitutions,andtheireffortsenjoyedincreasingsuccessas
theColdWarfadedintothepast.
jeffersoniansandjacksonianssawtheendoftheColdWarverydif-
ferentlythantheglobalists.Afterthetwoworldwars,jeffersoniansand
jacksonianshadseentheoutbreakofpeaceasprovidinganopportunity
fortheUnitedStatestoscalebackonitsinternationalcommitmentsand
toconcentratemoreattentionondomesticmatters.Theybothbelieved
thatwiththeendoftheSovietthreatitwaspossiblefortheUnitedStates
similarlytoscalebackitsmilitaryandpoliticalcommitmentsoverseas.
Althoughtherewerefranklyisolationistfiguresinthiscoalition-like
PatBuchanan,whose 1999 bookARepublic,NotanEmpireattackedFrank-
linRoosevelt'sdecisiontoenterWorldWarII-asa wholethecoalition
was less isolationist than nationalist. That is, unlike theglobalists,
nationalistsdidnotseethecreationofa favorableworldorderasthefirst
priorityofAmericanforeignpolicy; rather,theybelievedthatAmerican
nationalinterestscouldbeadequatelydefendedwithsomethinglessthan
anAmericancommitmenttoa totalworldorder,thattheUnitedStates
shouldconcentrateonparticularissues,regions,andproblemsrather
thanattempttobuilda universalorder.
Mostofthejacksoniansandjeffersoniansofthe1990Swereanything
butnaive.Thereweremilitarydangersoutthere,rangingfromnuclear
weaponstoterrorists;therewereeconomicdangerstoordinaryAmeri-
cansfrompredatorytradingnations;thereweremoralandpoliticaldan-
gersintheconceptofworldorderitself,a conceptthatthreatenedto
undermineAmericansovereigntyinvariousways. Globalists believed
thatonlya newworldordercouldadequatelysafeguardkeyAmerican
interests;nationalistsbelievedthatcertainaspectsofthatorderthem-
selvesconstitutedthreatstokeynationalinterests.
Yet thejeffersonianandjacksonianideas about nationalstrategy
remainedfarapart.jeffersonianstalkedabouta "peacedividend,"sought
toreducethesizeofthearmedforcesandoftheintelligenceservices,to
declassifymaterialfromtheColdWar,andtoscaledownorendAmeri-
cantroopcommitmentsinEuropeandtheFarEast.jacksonianswerenot
particularlyeagerformilitarycutbacksbutlookedtoreduce,thenumber
ofpoliticalandeconomicconcessionstheUnitedStatesmadeforthesake
ofitsColdWarstrategies.jeffersoniansthoughtthattheendoftheCold
WarhastenedthedaywhentheUnitedStatescouldcutbackonitsmili-
tarycommitmentstoSouthKoreaandjapan;jacksoniansbelievedthat