168
Originstribethat
paidthem.Thecentral
governmentdisbursedfundstothetriballeaders,whointurndistributedthemto
members
ofthe tribe; withfew
exceptions,mainlythedescendants ofeminent
S.ah.ba,Arabians(even
widowsandchildren)received
moneythrough
theirtribe.Until132/750,theMilitaryRegisterprovided
a
mainstayoftribal
powerand
privilegeagainstout-sidecontrol,anditallowedthe
tribesmento
preservetheircohe-sive
independencefrom other elements of the
population.Whenthe
governmenttriedto
replacethesetribal
corpswithother
troopswhose leaders,
allegiances,and interests morenearlymatcheditsown,theArabiantribesmenresisteditwithalmosttotalsuccess.Viewed
altogether,thetribal
organizationofthearmiesthatcarriedoutthe
greatconquestsand
its
preservationthroughtheMilitary Registermeantthatthe central
governmentdid notcontrolits
army.Thisledtounusual
developmentswhenthe
timecametorecruitnewsoldiers.Arabian
TroopUnreliability
after
64/684. As
marginalareasoldiersparexcellence,4Arabians
rapidlybecameunreliable.
Preciselyaccordingtothe
patternsketchedin
chapter3,inthe
60/680s,about two
generationsafterthe
conquestsbegan, theydete-riorated,
grewunruly,andno
longersuppliedthe
Umayyadswithsufficient
troops.Some settleddownintownsoronag-riculturallands,whileothersremainedsoldiersinthe
payofthegovernment
but
providedeverlessloyaland
dependableser-vice.Thisdivisionhadageographicalaspect;many
Arabiansset-tledinIraqandKhurasantoacquire
new
occupationsandinter-
ests,whilethose
livingin
Syriaand
Jazira
generallyremainedsoldiers.4In
IraqandKhurasantheArabiansdegeneratedmilitarily
de-spitestrenuous governmental
efforts. Measures
designedto40.ThisviewcontrastswithD.R.Hill’sconclusionthat"the
fightingcoreofthearmies
[inthefirstArabian
conquests]wasformedfromthesedentarypopulationofthetownsandoases"("TheRoleoftheCamel,"p.39).41.Mason,p.201;Shaban,Islamic
History,1:122-25.Mason’sarticle
appearstobethesourceofmanyofShaban’smost
importantthemes,
althoughShabannowherereferstoit.